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Life is very short, and there's no time
For fussing and fighting, my friend.
I have always thought that it's a crime,
So I will ask you once again.
Try to see it my way,
Only time will tell if I am right or I am wrong.
While you see it your way
There's a chance that we may fall apart before too long.
We can work it out,
We can work it out.'
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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Article examines the relationship between the Sixth Amend-
ment right to confrontation in criminal prosecutions and the Four-
teenth Amendment right to confrontation in formal parole,
probation, and supervised release revocation proceedings. Although in
most revocation hearings the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
presently has little-to-no influence over the Fourteenth Amendment due
process right to confrontation, the jurisprudence for the due process right
to confrontation in revocation proceedings must change to more closely
mirror Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because of
their entangled past, significant similarities between criminal prosecu-
tions and revocation proceedings, and constitutional concerns.2
Before analyzing this relationship, a quick introduction to the two main
characters of this Article is in order. First, the Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause provides a criminal defendant with a nearly absolute
right to confront and cross-examine a court witness who made out-of-
court testimonial statements against the defendant unless the witness is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to confrontation.3
Otherwise, prosecutors cannot introduce those testimonial statements in
criminal prosecutions.4
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment due process confrontation right
provides a probationer, parolee, or supervised releasee with a limited
right to confront and cross-examine out-of-court declarants in revocation
proceedings.5 In revocation proceedings, the confrontation requirement
is determined under various tests, which, among other factors, weigh the
reliability of the hearsay evidence at issue. 6
In examining the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to con-
frontation, there is no constitutional difference between probation,7
2. See infra Part V.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). The
only exceptions to this rule are those that were already established at common law when
America was founded, such as dying declarations and forfeiture by wrongdoing. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 54, 56 n.6.
4. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-89 (1972). The Fourteenth Amendment
provides confrontation rights in other settings as well, such as civil cases, but this Article
focuses on the confrontation right in formal revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (barring the government from taking away government
contractor's position without right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses).
6. See infra Part III.
7. The U.S. Department of Justice defines probation as "a court-ordered period of
correctional supervision in the community, generally as an alternative to incarceration. In
some cases, probation can be a combined sentence of incarceration followed by a period of
community supervision." LAUREN M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 239686, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE
UNITED STATEs, 2011, at 2 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ppusll.pdf.
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parole,8 or supervised release 9 revocation proceedings.10 Probationers,
parolees, and supervised releasees (collectively referred to as
"releasees"), who totaled over 4.8 million in America in 2010 (or one in
every fifty U.S. adult residents)," are supervised outside of prison and
have the right to a hearing with specific due process rights before a court
may revoke their probation, parole, or supervised release.' 2 Revocation
may occur for committing new crimes or even non-criminal acts, such as
missing an appointment.13 In 2011, for example, approximately 15% of all
probationers, or nearly 600,000 individuals, had their probations revoked
for new offenses or failing to meet probation conditions.14 Approximately
13% of all parolees, or over 111,000 individuals,' 5 were incarcerated due
to parole revocations that did not involve a new sentence.16 Because
these figures only pertain to individuals who actually had probation, pa-
role, or other community supervision revoked, hundreds of thousands
more releasees might have made appearances at revocation hearings
where the right to confront adverse out-of-court declarants would have
been imperative.
The Sixth Amendment confrontation right has received more attention
than the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to confrontation. Al-
though a plethora of legal scholarship examines the Sixth Amendment
8. Parole, including supervised release, is granted after a defendant has served some
or all of his or her sentence. See id. The U.S. Department of Justice defines parole as "a
period of conditional supervised release in the community following a prison term. It in-
cludes parolees released through discretionary or mandatory supervised release from
prison, those released through other types of post-custody conditional supervision, and
those sentenced to a term of supervised release." Id.; see also Brett M. Shockley, Note,
Protecting Due Process from the Protect Act: The Problems with Increasing Periods of Su-
pervised Release for Sexual Offenders, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 361-62 (2010).
9. Supervised release differs from parole in that a parole revocation only affects the
time of confinement as defined by the parameters of the original prison sentence, while a
revocation of supervised release can result in imprisonment that exceeds those parameters.
See Shockley, supra note 8, at 362 (quoting United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 276-77
(2d Cir. 2005)).
10. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 ("[There is no] difference relevant to the guarantee of
due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation . . . .");
United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Parole, probation, and super-
vised release revocation hearings are constitutionally indistinguishable and are analyzed in
the same manner."); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 710-11 (2000). There-
fore, the general term "revocation proceedings" or "revocation hearings" will be used
throughout this Article, and the term "releasees" will apply to probationers, parolees, and
supervised releasees, unless otherwise specifically stated.
11. MARUSHAK & PARKS, supra note 7, at 1. In 2011, there were approximately 3.97
million individuals on probation and over 850,000 individuals on parole. Id. at 1, 2.
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. This Article does not discuss those indi-
viduals seeking parole or probation. The grant or denial of parole or probation is a discre-
tionary decision, and there is no right to confrontation in these circumstances. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979).
13. See Peggy Burke, Public Safety Policy Brief, When Offenders Break the Rules:
Smart Responses to Parole and Probation Violations, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES,
No. 3, November 2007, at 2.
14. MARUSCHAK & PARKS, supra note 7, at 2, 5.
15. Id. at 1, 8.
16. In 2011, 5% of parolees returned to incarceration due to a new sentence.
MARUSHAK & PARKS, supra note 7, at 8.
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Confrontation Clause, articles that focus on the due process right to con-
frontation, especially in post-conviction revocation proceedings, are
few.' 7 At times, Sixth Amendment scholars have looked to due process
principles to resolve specific Confrontation Clause issues.1 8 Missing from
this discourse, however, are (1) an in-depth examination of whether the
Sixth Amendment should have substantial influence, or even any influ-
ence, on the Fourteenth Amendment confrontation right in revocation
proceedings; and (2) a detailed analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment
confrontation right in revocation hearings. 19 This Article provides such
an analysis.
The unbalanced scholarly treatment may be due in part to the Supreme
Court's reticence in one field and loquaciousness in the other. While the
Supreme Court has not issued a major decision regarding the due process
right to confrontation in revocation proceedings since its 1970s opinions
in Gagnon and Morrissey,20 it has issued more than twenty major deci-
sions from 1980 to 2012 that clarified, shaped, or re-shaped the Sixth
Amendment confrontation right.21
17. See, e.g., Brent M. Pattison, Questioning School Discipline: Due Process, Confron-
tation, and School Discipline Hearings, 18 TEMP. PoL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 49, 53-57
(2008) (stating that students should have the right to confront at in-school discipline hear-
ings); Bruce Zucker, The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses at Post-Conviction Release
Revocation Hearings, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 87, 87-89 (2008)
(analyzing limited right to confrontation in revocation proceedings and stating that there
should be more limitations on using only hearsay evidence at revocation proceedings);
Christine Holst, Note, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process
Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599, 1627 (proposing a due process solution to a defen-
dant's right to confrontation in pretrial proceedings). The due process right to confronta-
tion in revocation proceedings has been examined in the context of larger ideas. See, e.g.,
Thomas J. Bamonte, The Viability of Morrissey v. Brewer and the Due Process Rights of
Parolees and Other Conditional Releasees, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 124, 134, 136, 138 (1993)
(arguing that Morrissey's overall due process requirements are "outmoded" and explaining
in one section that confrontation and cross-examination rights under Morrissey have been
"non existent"); Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding
Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 134-35 (1984) (citing example of lax
enforcement of due process right to confrontation in revocation proceedings to show that
Morrissey did not rid all procedural injustices in revocation proceeding while also noting
improvement in general); Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85
TEX. L. REV. 271, 310-14 (2006) (discussing confrontation rights in domestic abuse cases
after Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), and recommending that state legislatures
revise their criminal procedure codes to admit hearsay in revocation proceedings as consti-
tutionally required); Daniel F. Piar, A Uniform Code of Procedure for Revoking Probation,
31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 153-61 (2003) (proposing code of procedure for probation revoca-
tion, including a balancing test to analyze a probationer's confrontation rights).
18. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 17, at 307 (discussing due process confrontation the-
ory as one possibility for solving problems raised by the Confrontation Clause in domestic
abuse cases after Davis v. Washington, but finding that "reliance on the Due Process
Clause is far from ideal").
19. See, e.g., id. at 326.
20. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
21. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Mas-
sachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Davis v. Washing-
ton, 547 U.S. 813; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.
116 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990);
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Lower courts, however, have not remained silent. After the pivotal de-
cisions regarding the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, lower
courts have grappled with the question of how much influence Confron-
tation Clause principles should have on the due process right to confron-
tation in revocation proceedings. The present-day consensus among lower
courts regarding the relationship between the two confrontation rights is
simply that no such relationship exists, and the courts have little-to-no
desire to bridge the divide. 22
This Article challenges the status quo and proposes that the due pro-
cess right to confrontation in revocation proceedings should be more
closely tied to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, and newly
issued Confrontation Clause principles should directly impact due pro-
cess confrontation analysis in revocation proceedings.
In pursuit of these goals, Part II summarizes the seminal cases that
have shaped and defined each confrontation right. Part III details the due
process right to confrontation in revocation hearings and sets forth the
different tests that federal and state courts employ to analyze a releasee's
due process right to confrontation. Part IV details the history between
the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights.
Primarily by examining how courts analyzed the admissibility of hearsay
forensic laboratory reports in revocation hearings after the Supreme
Court decided major Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause cases, Part
IV shows that until recently courts freely relied on Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause cases to analyze the due process right to confronta-
tion in revocation proceedings. Part V examines the theoretical and prac-
tical reasons why the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause should
exert more influence on the due process right to confrontation. In Part
VI, the Article recommends two changes to the due process right to con-
frontation in revocation proceedings. First, the Article proposes that the
right to confrontation in revocation hearings should arise from the Sixth
Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, so that the same Crawford
standards apply in revocation proceedings as in criminal prosecutions.
Second, if, in the alternative, the right to confrontation remains rooted in
the Fourteenth Amendment, it should still share the main framework of
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence while main-
taining its quintessential trait of flexibility. Specifically, following the cur-
rent Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, a releasee
should have the due process right only to confront declarants of testimo-
nial hearsay evidence. Additionally, slight modifications to the federal
balancing test should be made so that judges and hearing officers no
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987); Cruz v. New York,
481 U.S. 186 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530 (1986); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abro-
gated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
22. See infra Part IV.
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longer weigh the reliability of the hearsay evidence to determine whether
a releasee has the right to confrontation.
II. CASE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN REVOCATION
HEARINGS AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
This Part presents a survey of the seminal Supreme Court cases for
each confrontation right. The survey starts in the early 1970s when the
Supreme Court identified the due process requirements that applied in
revocation hearings, including the right to confrontation and cross-exami-
nation in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.23 The survey then
goes through time to examine the numerous Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause cases issued by the high Court, beginning with Ohio v. Rob-
erts2 4 and ending with Williams v. Illinois.25
A. MORRISSEY & GAoN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
Only two Supreme Court cases analyze in-depth the due process rights
required at revocation proceedings-Morrissey and Gagnon-and
neither of which places its main focus on the due process right to
confrontation. 26
In Morrissey and Gagnon, the Supreme Court recognized a due process
right to confrontation and cross-examination in both the informal and
formal stages of the revocation process. 27 The Court did not rationalize
or justify these rights; they were assumed inherent once the Court deter-
mined that the Due Process Clause applied.28 The Court emphasized that
because revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, the "full
panoply of rights" of criminal prosecutions does not apply in revocation
hearings,29 and flexibility is required, especially with respect to the con-
frontation right.30
1. Morissey v. Brewer
In 1972, the Court in Morrissey expressly acknowledged for the first
time that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applied in pa-
role revocation hearings and that this due process right included certain
procedural guarantees, including the right to confrontation and cross-ex-
amination. 31 The Court identified two stages of a typical revocation pro-
23. Gagnon, 778 U.S. at 779; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472.
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56.
25. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
26. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 779; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472.
27. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-82; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484-85.
28. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-82; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 485-87.
29. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-82; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
30. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.5, 788; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89.
31. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 485-87.
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cess-(1) an arrest and preliminary hearing and (2) a revocation
hearing-and set forth minimum due process requirements for each
stage.32
In the first, less-formal stage of the revocation process, an independent
officer determines whether probable cause or reasonable grounds exist to
find a violation of parole.33 The minimum due process requirements at
this first stage include the right to confrontation and cross-examination. 34
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that "[o]n request of the parolee,
[the] person who has given adverse information on which parole revoca-
tion is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his pres-
ence."35 "However, if the hearing officer determines that an informant
would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need
not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examination." 3 6
In the second stage of the revocation process-the formal revocation
hearing-a neutral and detached body makes a "final evaluation" of con-
tested facts and determines if parole should be formally revoked. 37 Six
minimum due process requirements apply, one of which is "the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)." 3 8 The
Court did not expressly state what constitutes good cause for dispensing
with the right to confrontation at the formal revocation hearing, although
it presumably includes risk of harm to the witness, as the Court noted
when discussing the right to confrontation in the first, informal stage of
revocation.39
An overarching principle-the start and end point of the Court's rea-
soning in Morrissey-is that "the revocation of parole is not part of the
criminal prosecution and [therefore] the full panoply of rights" in a crimi-
32. Id. at 485-87.
33. Id. at 485.
34. Id. at 485-86. The Court also required that a neutral individual make a preliminary
evaluation that the parolee receive notice of the hearing and its purpose and alleged viola-
tions; that the parolee have the opportunity to appear and speak on his own behalf, includ-
ing bringing letters, documents, and relevant individuals; and that a parolee be given a
summary or digest of what occurred at the hearing and the reasons for the hearing officer's
determination. Id. at 485-87.
35. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 489.
38. Id. at 488-89. The other minimum requirements at revocation hearings include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; . . . (e) a 'neutral
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written state-
ment by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for re-
voking parole.
Id. at 489.
39. See id. at 487 ("[If the hearing officer determines that an informant would be
subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to con-
frontation and cross-examination.").
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nal prosecution does not apply in parole revocation hearings.4 0 Unlike a
criminal prosecution, the formal revocation hearing "is a narrow inquiry;
the process . .. [is] flexible enough to consider evidence including letters,
affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adver-
sary criminal trial."41
2. Gagnon v. Scarpelli
Approximately seven months later, in Gagnon, the Supreme Court ex-
tended Morrissey's requirements to state probation revocation hearings. 42
The Court reasoned that similar to parole revocation, a state probation
revocation "is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a
loss of liberty."43 Therefore, it "h[e]ld that a probationer . . . [was] enti-
tled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions
specified in Morrissey," including the right to confrontation and cross-
examination.44
The Court also addressed the state's greatest concern regarding the
probationer's right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses: "the
difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of
miles away." 45 The Court stated that "[w]hile in some cases there is sim-
ply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did
not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conven-
tional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and
documentary evidence." 46 The Court also encouraged states to develop
"creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey require-
ments," such as holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the
place of violation.47
The only other significant mention of the probationer's right to con-
frontation arose in the context of determining whether a probationer has
a right to an attorney at a revocation hearing. 48 The Court acknowledged
that "[d]espite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of
technical rules of procedure or evidence," an attorney may be required to
examine or cross-examine witnesses. 49 Ultimately, the Court held that
"the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis."50
After Morrissey and Gagnon, the Supreme Court did not revisit the
issue of confrontation rights under the Due Process Clause in revocation
hearings. While the Court has been silent in further defining the Four-
teenth Amendment right to confrontation in revocation hearings, it has
40. Id. at 480.
41. Id. at 489.
42. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 782 n.5.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 786-87.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 790.
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issued numerous decisions regarding the Sixth Amendment right to con-
frontation in criminal trials.
B. FROM ROBERTS TO CRAWFORD TO TODAY: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The Supreme Court first applied the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause in Mattox v. United States.51 Throughout the 1900s, the Court
maintained a "pragmatic perspective on the Confrontation Clause,"
warning that the right to confrontation must at times cede to public policy
and case necessities. 52 In Roberts, which began the modern-day Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, 53 the Court "drew the
line" between the right to confrontation and other necessities at
reliability. 54
After Roberts, the Supreme Court continued to clarify the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation in opinions that applied or restricted
the use of the Roberts rule to different types of evidence.55 Then came
Crawford v. Washington.56
As one news report aptly summarized, Crawford was viewed as "an
earthquake rocking America's criminal justice foundations."57 Crawford
overruled Roberts and presented a completely new interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause.58 Under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause bars
prosecutors from introducing out-of-court testimonial statements into ev-
idence against a defendant unless the witness is unavailable and the de-
fendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.59
After Crawford, the Court issued numerous decisions that applied the
new standard to different types of evidence.60
51. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
52. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1647 (2009)
(citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
53. Lininger, supra note 17, at 276.
54. Sklansky, supra note 52, at 1647-48.
55. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
357 (1992).
56. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
57. Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Note, Crawford's Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of Non-
testimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1497, 1498 (2008) (quoting Kevin Drew, At 33, He's a Two-Time Supreme Court
Winner, CNN.com (July 23, 2004, 2:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/21/seattle
attorney) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57-69.
59. Id. at 58. The only exceptions that applied are those exceptions that were estab-
lished when the Confrontation Clause was promulgated, such as dying declarations and
forfeiture by wrongdoing. Id. at 56 n.6.
60. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Mas-
sachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Davis v. Washing-
ton, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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1. Ohio v. Roberts
In Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the testimony of an unavaila-
ble witness was admissible against a criminal defendant as long as the
statements met "adequate 'indicia of reliability.'"61 Reliability was in-
ferred when the evidence fell under "a firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or there was "a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 6 2
Roberts was the Court's first significant attempt to define the relation-
ship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. 6 3 The Court
acknowledged that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule were
both "generally designed to protect similar values" and that they
"stem[med] from the same roots." 64
The meaning and purpose of the Confrontation Clause helped shape or
"restrict the range of admissible hearsay." 65 And according to the Court,
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to showcase the "Framers'
preference for face-to-face accusation" and to "augment accuracy in the
factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence." 66 This purpose resulted in the Court's requirements
that: (1) the prosecution carry the burden to "demonstrate the unavaila-
bility of [ ] the declarant" and (2) an unavailable witness's testimony bear
some indicia of reliability. 67 Specifically, a witness was "unavailable"
when the prosecution showed that it made a good faith effort to obtain
that witness's presence.68 "The lengths to which the prosecution must go
to produce a witness . . . [was] a question of reasonableness." 69 Next, the
testimony bore some indicia of reliability if the evidence fell under "a
firmly rooted hearsay exception" or there was "a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness."7 0
After Roberts, the Court further clarified its rule as it deciphered which
hearsay exceptions were firmly rooted, what type of evidence contained
sufficiently particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, and when the
Confrontation Clause did not apply.7'
61. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 64-66.
64. Id. at 66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 65.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 65-66.
68. Id. at 74.
69. Id. (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 189 n.22 (Harlan, J., concurring )) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
70. Id. at 66.
71. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125-39 (1999) (finding that accomplice's
confessions that incriminate defendants are not firmly rooted hearsay exception) (plurality
opinion).
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2. Crawford v. Washington
A little more than two decades after Roberts, the Supreme Court in
Crawford v. Washington72 significantly changed the landscape of the Con-
frontation Clause. Rather than relying on the "amorphous" concept of
reliability, the Court announced that the Confrontation Clause bars the
prosecution from introducing out-of-court testimonial statements against
a defendant unless that witness is unavailable and the defendant has had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.73 The only exceptions
are those that were established at common law, such as dying declara-
tions and forfeiture by wrongdoing. 74 As for nontestimonial hearsay
statements, it is unclear whether the Confrontation Clause applied at
all.75
The court left the all-important, comprehensive definition of "testimo-
nial" for another day.7 6 However, the term "testimonial" at least applies
"to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial, and to police interrogations."7 7 To support this new interpre-
tation of the Confrontation Clause, the Court harked back to Roman
times, the 16th and 17th centuries (specifically, the 1603 trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh for treason), the founding era of the United States, the early
cases interpreting Sixth Amendment history, and the unworkability of the
Roberts rule.78
The Court's history lesson underscored the primary concern of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause-"testimonial," out-of-court
statements.79 The Confrontation Clause was created to fight "the princi-
pal evil" of using "the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particu-
larly . . . ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused."80 The
historical record also showed that "the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination." 8 Furthermore, the unpredict-
ability and erroneous applications of the Roberts test supported the
72. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
73. Id. at 63, 68.
74. Id. at 56 n.6. The "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception to the Confrontation
Clause only applies when "the defendant engage[s] in conduct designed to prevent the
witness from testifying." Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008).
75. See Lininger, supra note 17, at 278, 286 (observing that "the Crawford opinion did
not explicitly overturn Roberts as a test for the admission of nontestimonial hearsay" and
finding that after Crawford, most lower courts still applied the Roberts test to nontestimo-
nial hearsay until the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006));
Sklansky, supra note 52, at 1651 (stating that the Crawford court did not convey "whether
the Roberts test, or any other requirements derived from the Confrontation Clause, would
continue to apply to nontestimonial hearsay introduced against a criminal defendant").
76. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 43-50.
79. See id. at 51-53.
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id. at 53-54.
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Court's proclamation that a new rule was needed.82 Rather than rely on a
judicial determination of reliability, which was anathema to the Fram-
ers,83 the Court held that the only way to get to reliability-the Confron-
tation Clause's ultimate goal-was to test the evidence "in the crucible of
cross-examination."8
3. After Crawford
A succession of Supreme Court cases after Crawford applied the new
standard to different types of evidence and attempted to create a more
precise test or definition of "testimonial."85 In Davis v. Washington,86 the
Supreme Court "completely overturned Roberts as a test for confronta-
tion in any context," regardless of whether the hearsay evidence was tes-
timonial or non-testimonial, and also attempted to clarify the term
"testimonial."8 7 As Professor Fisher observed, the Court created three
tests to separate testimonial statements from nontestimonial ones: the
emergency-non-emergency dichotomy, the past-present dichotomy, and
the "'what-a-witness-does' test."88 Professor Fisher also observed that
most courts after Davis relied on the emergency-non-emergency dichot-
omy to determine if statements were testimonial.89 Thus, statements
made in police interrogations with the primary purpose of helping police
meet an emergency were nontestimonial, and statements made when
there was no ongoing emergency were testimonial.90 Later, in Michigan v.
Bryant,91 the Supreme Court applied the "primary purpose of interroga-
tion" rule to find that a dying victim's statements to police were nontesti-
monial because the victim answered police officers' questions before
emergency medical services arrived and the primary purpose of the inter-
rogation was to respond to an ongoing emergency. 92 In Giles v. Califor-
nia,93 the Court opined on the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" exception to
the Confrontation Clause and held that "the exception applies only when
the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying." 94
After Giles, the Supreme Court applied the Confrontation Clause in
cases involving forensic evidence. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id. at 67.
84. Id. at 61.
85. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
86. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
87. Lininger, supra note 17, at 286; see also Sklansky, supra note 52, at 1651.
88. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened-and What Is Happening-to the Confrontation
Clause, 15 J.L. & PoL'Y 587, 588-89 (2007).
89. Id. at 589.
90. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
91. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
92. Id. at 1150, 1162-67 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
93. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
94. Id. at 359.
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Court held that certifications of forensic laboratory test results are testi-
monial statements. 5 In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Court empha-
sized its holding in Melendez-Diaz and found that the Sixth Amendment
prohibited a surrogate analyst-one who did not prepare the certifica-
tions and did not perform or observe the forensic test-from testifying in
trial about the forensic laboratory report.96 Most recently, in Williams v.
Illinois, a majority of Justices held that testimonial statements in forensic
reports are still testimonial even if introduced through expert witnesses.97
However, a plurality of the Justices found that the DNA profile at issue in
the case, which was introduced through expert-opinion testimony, was
not testimonial because it was not introduced for the truth of the matter
asserted,98 and even if it were, it still did not violate the Confrontation
Clause because the primary purpose of the report was not to prove a
defendant's guilt.99 However, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, found
that the laboratory's out-of-court statements entered into evidence
through expert testimony were not "testimonial" because they lacked suf-
ficient "formality and solemnity."100
This Part presented a summary of the important decisions of each con-
frontation right. In comparing the Supreme Court's treatment of the two
confrontation rights, there are two obvious differences. First, the number
of opinions discussing each confrontation right is vastly different. The Su-
preme Court issued at least twenty opinions about the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause from 1980 to 2012.101 The Court created two differ-
ent tests (one in Roberts and one in Crawford) to determine a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right and then issued numerous
opinions that clarified each test.102 In contrast, the Supreme Court only
discussed the due process right to confrontation in revocation proceed-
ings in two cases, Morrissey and Gagnon,03 and the due process right to
confrontation was a small part of the larger discussion of general due
process requirements in revocation proceedings in those cases. Also, in
the Sixth Amendment context, the Supreme Court aimed to give clear
direction to lower courts on how they were to uphold a defendant's Sixth
Amendment confrontation right in criminal trials.104 However, the Su-
preme Court specifically delegated to states and lower courts the task of
working out the exact details and rules of the due process requirements in
revocation hearings, including the right to confrontation and cross-exami-
nation. 05 The Court has yet to take an in-depth look at the right to con-
95. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309, 329 (2009).
96. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
97. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2012) (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 2235-38.
99. Id. at 2243-44.
100. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
102. See supra Part II.B.
103. See supra Part II.A.
104. See supra Part II.B.
105. Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972).
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frontation in revocation hearings.
The next part picks up where the Supreme Court left off after Morris-
sey and Gagnon and explains the different tests that lower federal and
state courts use to analyze a releasee's due process right to confrontation
in revocation proceedings.
III. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN
REVOCATION HEARINGS: BALANCING TEST, RELIABILITY
TEST, AND FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 32.1(B)
After Morrissey and Gagnon, two main tests emerged in the federal
courts to analyze a releasee's Fourteenth Amendment right to confronta-
tion in revocation hearings: the balancing test and the reliability test. 06
Recently, however, amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32.1(b) have cast doubt on whether the reliability test is still good law. 07
States have followed one of these two federal tests, or have adopted their
own tests, which share similarities with the federal tests.108
In each of these tests, a judicial determination regarding the reliability
of the hearsay evidence is pivotal to determining whether confrontation is
required.109 Specifically, in the federal reliability test, judges weigh only
the reliability of the hearsay evidence before deciding whether confronta-
tion is required.110 In the federal balancing test, a judicial determination
of the hearsay evidence's reliability determines the good cause the gov-
ernment must show to overcome a releasee's right to confrontation."'
Also, many state courts that apply their own tests for confrontation use
either a more difficult or an easier standard for the government to over-
come a releasee's right to confrontation based on pre-determined beliefs
about the reliability of certain types of evidence.112
The emphasis on a judicial determination of reliability is the key differ-
ence between the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and the Four-
teenth Amendment right to confrontation. 1' 3 In other words, although
the Crawford Court held that the only way to determine reliability (the
Confrontation Clause's ultimate goal) is to test the evidence "in the cruci-
ble of cross-examination,"11 4 courts continue to rely on a judicial deter-
mination of reliability under the Fourteenth Amendment right to
106. See infra Part HILA-B.
107. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
108. See infra Part III.D.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the federal balancing
test); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 n.5 (1973)).
110. See infra Part ILA, C, E.
111. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
112. See infra Part III.E.
113. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004), with Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
114. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (2004).
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confrontation.1 15 In this way, courts are still firmly grasping the overruled
concept from Roberts that hearsay evidence determined to have sufficient
indicia of reliability does not require confrontation.' 16
A. THE FEDERAL BALANCING TEST
The majority of the federal appellate courts" 7-the First, 18 Third,119
Fourth,120 Fifth,121 Eighth, 122 Ninth,123 and Eleventhl 24 Circuits-apply
the federal balancing test to a releasee's due process right to confronta-
tion in revocation hearings. The balancing test consists of two major
prongs: (1) a releasee's right to or interest in confrontation and (2) the
government's good cause for denying the releasee's right to confronta-
tion.125 When the releasee's right to confrontation outweighs the govern-
ment's good cause, then the hearsay evidence is not admissible.126 But if
the government's good cause outweighs the releasee's right to confronta-
tion, then the hearsay evidence may be admitted in the revocation pro-
ceeding without offending the releasee's due process right to
confrontation. 12 7
Courts have differed in their analysis of the first prong-a releasee's
right to confrontation. For example, the Ninth Circuit conducts two sepa-
rate inquiries to analyze this factor.128 The first inquiry-the "importance
of the evidence to the court's ultimate finding"-signifies that the more
important the hearsay evidence is to the court's ultimate ruling in the
revocation hearing, the more substantial the releasee's interest in con-
frontation.129 The second inquiry examines whether there is a complete
denial of any other right to confrontation; if so, then the releasee's inter-
est in confronting the out-of-court declarant is more significant.130 An-
other factor-the consequences of finding a violation-increases a
releasee's interest in confrontation when the consequences are more se-
vere.131 Other courts, however, are less keen to engage in such a detailed
115. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; infra notes 118-24, 138-41, and accompanying
text.
116. See, e.g., infra notes 118-24, 138-41, and accompanying text.
117. The Federal Circuit does not hear revocation cases.
118. United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532, 536-37 (1st Cir. 2004).
119. United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2009).
120. United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit
recently adopted the balancing test, reasoning that the language of Rule 32.1 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that courts apply the balancing test. Id.
121. United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2010).
122. United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844-45 (8th Cir. 2004).
123. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 2005).
124. United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir.1994).
125. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
128. United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1993).
129. Id. at 311.
130. Id. at 311-12.
131. Id. at 312. This factor is not always considered. See, e.g., United States v. Comito,
177 F.3d 1166, 1171 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1999).
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analysis for this first prong and "have tended to focus nearly exclusively
on the 'good cause' side of the balance." 132
The second prong of the balancing test examines the government's
good cause for denying confrontation.' 33 This analysis generally consists
of two sub-factors: (1) "difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses"
and (2) the hearsay evidence's indicia of reliability. 134 Reliability is a very
important component in determining whether good cause exists to dis-
pense with confrontation.13 5
When a releasee's interest in confrontation outweighs the govern-
ment's showing of good cause, the Fourteenth Amendment bars the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence.136 When it does not, then hearsay evidence
is admissible without offending a releasee's right to confrontation.13 7
B. THE FEDERAL RELIABILITY TEST
Four circuit courts-the Sixth,138 Seventh,139 Tenth, 140 and D.C.14 1 Cir-
cuits-follow the reliability test. The reliability test holds that the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence does not violate a releasee's due process right to
confrontation as long as the hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable.142
There is no requirement that the government show good cause for deny-
ing confrontation.143
For hearsay evidence to be deemed reliable, the evidence must "bear[ ]
substantial guarantees of trust-worthiness." 144 Examples of evidence with
sufficient "indicia of reliability include: (1) the conventional substitutes
for live testimony (e.g., affidavits, depositions, and documentary evi-
dence), (2) statements falling under an established exception to the hear-
say rule, (3) statements corroborated by detailed police investigative
reports, and (4) statements corroborated by the releasee's own
statements."145
132. Martin, 984 F.2d at 310.
133. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
134. Martin, 984 F.2d at 312-13 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 n.5
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561,
564 (9th Cir. 1987)).
135. See United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Reliability of the
challenged hearsay is a 'critical consideration' in a district court's determination of whether
good cause exists to disallow confrontation.").
136. See supra notes 117-24.
137. See supra notes 117-24.
138. United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 628 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit has also
applied the balancing test in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 940
(6th Cir. 1998).
139. United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2006).
140. Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 545 (10th Cir. 2010).
141. Singletary v. Reilly, 452 F.3d 868, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
142. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
144. Egerstaffer v. Israel, 726 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1984).
145. Curtis, 626 F.3d at 545.
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C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S MIXED TEST
The Second Circuit applies a unique two-part test to determine the ad-
missibility of hearsay evidence in revocation proceedings. 146 When the
evidence is inadmissible under an established exception to the hearsay
rule, the court applies the standard federal balancing test and weighs a
releasee's interest in confrontation against the government's showing of
good cause.147 However, if the evidence at issue is admissible under an
established exception to the hearsay rule in criminal trials, then good
cause does not need to be shown.148
D. THE FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32.1(B)
In addition to the due process right, Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 32.1 also directs federal courts to uphold a releasee's right to con-
frontation in revocation proceedings.149 The most recent 2002
amendments to Rule 32.1 may signal that federal courts should only use
the balancing test.'50
After the Supreme Court decided Gagnon and Morrissey, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended to include Rule 32.1, effec-
tive December 1, 1980.151 The standards followed the minimum require-
ments set forth in Gagnon and Morrissey.152 Revocation hearings were
not formal trials, and the usual rules of evidence did not necessarily
apply.'53
When first issued, Rule 32.1(a)(2)(C) granted the probationer "an op-
portunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf."154 The
Committee clarified in its 1979 notes that "upon request by the proba-
tioner, adverse witnesses shall be made available for questioning unless
the magistrate determines that the informant would be subjected to risk
of harm if his identity were disclosed." 55 Rule 32.1(a)(2)(D) gave the
probationer "the opportunity to question witnesses against him."156 The
Committee also explained that under this section, "the probationer d[id]
not have to specifically request the right to confront adverse witnesses,
and the court may not limit the opportunity to question the witnesses
against him."' 57
Minor modifications were made to Rule 32.1, but most recently, in
146. See United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B)(iii), (b)(2)(c).
150. See id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (2002 Amendments).
151. See Act of July 31, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1
advisory committee's note (1979 Addition).
152. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note (1979 Addition).
153. Id.
154. Id. 32.1(a)(2)(C) (1979).
155. Id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (1979 Addition).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 32.1 (a)(2)(D) (1979).
157. Id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (1979 Addition).
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2002, it was changed significantly.s58 Now, the rule expressly provides
that a releasee "is entitled to . .. question any adverse witness unless the
court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to
appear."159 Relying on Morrissey and decisions by the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, the Committee explained in its 2002 notes, that these "provi-
sions recognize that the court should apply a balancing test at the hearing
itself when considering the releasee's asserted right to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses. The court is to balance the person's interest in the consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to confrontation against the government's
good cause for denying it."160
In light of this 2002 amendment, some courts have questioned the via-
bility of the reliability test.161 The Fourth Circuit, in Doswell, expressly
overruled its earlier cases that applied the reliability test and formally
adopted the balancing test to analyze a releasee's due process right to
confrontation. 162 The Tenth Circuit, in Curtis v. Chester, also questioned
whether the reliability test was still good law.16 3
However, even after this amendment, some courts still apply the relia-
bility test, explaining that the test is very similar to the majority's balanc-
ing test.164 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that it "treats a finding
of 'substantial trustworthiness' as the equivalent of a good cause find-
ing." 165 The Tenth Circuit also explained that the two tests overlap, espe-
cially in how important the reliability factor is in determining whether the
opportunity to confront is required.166
E. THE STATE TESTS
Since Gagnon, state courts are also required to uphold a releasee's
right to confrontation under the Due Process Clause.167 State courts ap-
ply either one of the two federal tests to analyze a releasee's right to
confrontation or apply their own tests, which share key similarities with
158. Compare id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (1987 Amendments), id. 32.1 advisory
committee's note (1989 Amendments), id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (1991 Amend-
ments), and id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments), with id. 32.1 advisory
committee's note (2002 Amendments).
159. Id. 32.1(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
160. Id. 32.1 advisory committee's note (2002 Amendments) (citing Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Zentgraf, 20 F.3d
906 (8th Cir. 1994)).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2012); Curtis v.
Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 545-46 (10th Cir. 2010).
162. See Doswell, 670 F.3d at 530-31.
163. See Curtis, 626 F.3d at 545-46.
164. See, e.g., id. at 546; United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2006).
165. Kelley, 446 F.3d at 692.
166. Curtis, 626 F.3d at 546.
167. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785-86 (1973).
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the federal tests. 168 For example, Indiana,169 Oklahoma,170 and Massa-
chusetts17 1 courts apply the reliability test, finding that once the reliability
of hearsay evidence is established, a separate finding of good cause is not
necessary. However, states such as Texas,172 Washington,173 South Da-
kota,174 and Utah'75 have adopted the balancing test.
Some states have created their own standards.176 For example, both
New Mexico and California have tests that depend on the type of evi-
dence.177 New Mexico courts apply a "sliding scale" analysis such that
certain types of evidence do not require the government's showing of
good cause and other types of evidence do.'78 Hearsay evidence that is
"uncontested, corroborated by other reliable evidence, and documented
by a reliable source without a motive to fabricate, or possibly situations
where the evidence is about an objective conclusion, a routine recording,
or a negative fact, making the demeanor and credibility of the witness less
relevant to the truth-finding process" does not require that the govern-
ment show good cause for denying confrontation.179 However, evidence
that is "contested by the defendant, unsupported or contradicted, and its
source has a motive to fabricate; it is about a subjective, judgment-based
observation that is subject to inference and interpretation, and makes a
conclusion that is central to the necessary proof that the defendant vio-
lated probation" requires that the government show good cause before
denying confrontation. 180 Otherwise, confrontation is required for the ev-
idence to be admissible.' 8 '
Similarly, California courts apply two different tests depending on
whether the evidence is documentary or testimonial.182 For documentary
hearsay evidence, the evidence is viewed as trustworthy and admissible in
probation revocation proceedings without confrontation "when there are
'sufficient indicia of reliability.'""83 A separate finding of good cause for
168. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 2009 OK D4 4, 1 17, 203 P.3d 179, 184-85; In re M.P.,
220 S.W.3d 99, 110 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. denied).
169. Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ind. 2007) ("We find the substantial trustwor-
thiness test the more effective means for determining the hearsay evidence that should be
admitted at a probation revocation hearing.").
170. Hampton, 203 P.3d at 184-85.
171. Commonwealth v. Negron, 808 N.E.2d 294, 300 (Mass. 2004) ("In other words, if
reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied.").
172. M.P., 220 S.W.3d at 110.
173. State v. Abd-Rahmaan, 111 P.3d 1157, 1161-62 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
174. State v. Beck, 2000 SD 141, 11, 619 N.W.2d 247, 250.
175. State v. Tate, 1999 UT App. 302, 11, 989 P.2d 73, 75.
176. See, e.g., State v. Guthrie, 2011-NMSC-014, 1 40, 257 P.3d 904, 915; People v.
Brown, 263 Cal. Rptr. 391, 392 (Ct. App. 1989).
177. See, e.g., Guthrie, 2011-NMSC, IT 40-41; Brown, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
178. Guthrie, 2011-NMSC, IT 40-41.
179. Id. 1 40.
180. Id. 41.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., People v. Arreola, 875 P.2d 736, 746 (Cal. 1994) (in bank); Brown, 263
Cal. Rptr. at 392.
183. Brown, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (quoting United States v. Penn., 721 F.2d 762, 765
(11th Cir. 1983)).
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the absence of the declarant is not required.1 8 4 However, for hearsay evi-
dence that is "testimonial," a showing of good cause is required before it
is admitted.185 Generally, good cause exists "(1) when the declarant is
'unavailable' under the traditional hearsay standard, (2) when the declar-
ant, although not legally unavailable, can be brought to the hearing only
through great difficulty or expense, or (3) when the declarant's presence
would pose a risk of harm to the declarant." 8 6 Courts must also consider
other relevant circumstances, including "the purpose for which the evi-
dence is offered . .. ; the significance of the particular evidence to a fac-
tual determination relevant to a finding of violation of probation; and
whether other admissible evidence," such as the probationer's admis-
sions, corroborates the evidence.187
Then, there are states that refuse to take a clear stance.188 For example,
Virginia courts have expressly "decline[d] to determine whether either
[federal] test, or both tests, or other methods of analysis are mandatory in
evaluating good cause for the admission of hearsay in probation revoca-
tion hearings."189
As stated in the introduction to this part, these due process confronta-
tion tests involve a judicial determination of reliability. 190 In the balanc-
ing test, a judicial determination of the hearsay evidence's reliability
determines how much good cause the government must show to over-
come a releasee's right to confrontation.191 In the reliability test, the reli-
ability of the hearsay evidence is the only question asked.192 As for state
courts that follow different tests depending on the type of evidence, their
tests inherently examine how independently reliable the evidence is
before deciding which standard to apply.193
The necessity and importance of a judicial determination of reliability
shows the key difference between the Sixth Amendment right to confron-
tation in criminal trials versus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to con-
frontation in revocation proceedings. As for criminal trials, the Crawford
Court held that the only way to determine reliability was to test the evi-
dence "in the crucible of cross-examination."1 9 4 But in revocation hear-
ings, a backwards-Crawford rule is applied: judges determine the
reliability of the hearsay evidence to determine whether the releasee
should have the right to confront the declarant.195 In this way, courts are
184. See id.
185. Arreola, 875 P.2d at 746.
186. Id. (citation omitted)
187. Id. at 746-47.
188. See, e.g., Henderson v. Commonwealth, 722 S.E.2d 275, 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
189. Id.
190. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
191. See United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 531 (4th Cir. 2012).
192. See Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 547-48 (10th Cir. 2010).
193. See, e.g., Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 441-42 (Ind. 2007); In re M.P., 220 S.W.3d
99, 111-12 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. denied).
194. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
195. See Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at 441-42.
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still embracing the now-overruled Roberts idea that hearsay evidence that
is judicially determined to have sufficient indicia of reliability does not
require confrontation.19 6
Based on Parts II and III of this Article, it appears that the two con-
frontation rights always existed and continue to exist in their own sepa-
rate space, with no legal principle or analytical tool to join the two. In
Part II, the survey of cases showed that the Supreme Court treats these
two confrontation rights very separately.197 The Court has yet to issue an
in-depth analysis of the relationship, if any, between the Fourteenth
Amendment confrontation right in revocation hearings and the Sixth
Amendment confrontation right in criminal prosecution. Also, as ex-
plained in this part, the different tests for confrontation in revocation
proceedings that are employed by federal and state courts are far from
the comparatively simple rule set forth in Crawford for criminal
prosecutions.1 98
However, to conclude that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment con-
frontation rights are, and always have been, two completely separate enti-
ties is inaccurate. As explained in Part IV, the relationship between the
two rights is much more complicated and intertwined.
IV. THE PAST AND PRESENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION IN REVOCATION HEARINGS AS SHOWN
THROUGH THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FORENSIC
LABORATORY REPORTS
Presently, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in criminal
prosecutions and the Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation in
revocation hearings mandate very different tests to determine the admis-
sibility of evidence made by out-of-court declarants. As discussed in Part
II, in the Sixth Amendment context under Crawford, confrontation is
necessary to determine reliability; but in the Fourteenth Amendment
context, an initial judicial determination of reliability plays a critical role
in determining whether confrontation is even necessary, similar to the
rule in Roberts.199
Releasees have asked courts to apply the Crawford rule in revocation
hearings so that hearsay evidence generally would not be admissible un-
less the releasee had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-
court declarant.200 Such requests have been answered with a clear and
196. See supra Part II.B.1.
197. See supra Part II.
198. See supra Part III A.-E.
199. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2012); Curtis v.
Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 543 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 333 (5th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Geathers, 297 F. App'x 885, 886-87 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Walker,
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resounding no.20 1
Similar requests in the past to apply Sixth Amendment principles in
revocation proceedings were answered differently than they are now.2 0 2
After the Supreme Court decided Ohio v. Roberts in 1980, courts readily
applied Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause principles to the due
process right to confrontation in revocation proceedings, even mistakenly
equating the two rights.203 After Crawford, the dependence on Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence abruptly stopped.204
To illustrate this changing relationship, this Article examines how
courts analyzed the admissibility of hearsay forensic laboratory reports in
revocation hearings after key Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
cases: Roberts, Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming.205
For two reasons, forensic laboratory reports serve as a compelling lens
through which to analyze the influence, or lack thereof, that the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause had on the Fourteenth Amendment
confrontation right in revocation hearings. First, forensic laboratory re-
ports are very specific types of hearsay evidence, and extraneous factors
play less of a role in determining the admissibility of the evidence. 206 For
example, if one were to examine the admissibility of an out-of-court de-
clarant's statement to the police, then one may also have to examine the
specific context of the statements to see if it had an influence on admissi-
bility.2 0 7 Second, the treatment of forensic laboratory reports for pur-
poses of confrontation recently underwent a vast change. 208 The Supreme
Court recently held in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that certifications
of forensic laboratory reports are testimonial209 and, therefore, not ad-
missible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to examine the de-
clarant under Crawford.210 The clear shift in the character of forensic
263 F. App'x 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688,
691 (7th Cir. 2006); Ashley v. Reilly, 431 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v.
Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47-49 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 984-85
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 2004).
201. See cases cited supra note 200.
202. Compare Flewallen v. Faulkner, 677 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam),
with Kelly, 446 F.3d at 691.
203. See, e.g., Flewallen, 677 F.2d at 612-13.
204. See, e.g., Rondeau, 430 F.3d at 47.
205. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709-10 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004);
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
206. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240-41 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at
2250 (Breyer, J., concurring); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318.
207. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2727; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318; Crawford, 541
U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-24
(1990)).
208. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310.
209. In Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232-33 (2012), a plurality of justices concluded that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were not violated when an expert testi-
fied about scientific reports if the reports themselves were not admitted into evidence. 132
S. Ct. at 2232-33 (plurality opinion).
210. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310.
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laboratory reports-from nontestimonial to testimonial 21 1 and from in-
herently reliable and neutral to sometimes flawed and biased 212-makes
it easier to see if these recent Sixth Amendment cases had any influence
on the treatment of forensic laboratory reports in revocation hearings for
purposes of confrontation.
This Article focuses on cases from the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits because these cases most clearly illustrate how courts in revocation
hearings shifted in their reliance on Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause cases. At the end, a summary of cases from other courts is also
presented.
A. THE FIFrH CIRCUIT
In the Roberts era, the Fifth Circuit welcomed Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence into revocation proceedings to determine
the admissibility of forensic laboratory reports.213 However, once Craw-
ford was decided, the Fifth Circuit kept Sixth Amendment confrontation
cases out, even when principles from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that
were not tied exclusively to the Sixth Amendment had direct relevance
over the admissibility of hearsay forensic laboratory reports.214
Less than six months after the Supreme Court decided Roberts, the
Fifth Circuit examined the admissibility of a releasee's laboratory report,
which tested positive for cocaine, in a probation revocation hearing in
United States v. Caldera.215 In Caldera, the probationer appealed the trial
court's admission of the report, arguing that the trial court denied his
right to confront and cross-examine the person who prepared it.216 The
Fifth Circuit agreed that the trial court denied the probationer his con-
frontation right.217 The court relied exclusively on a Sixth Amendment
case, United States v. Cain, and did not even mention the Fourteenth
Amendment right to confrontation. 218
Later, in United States v. Kindred,219 the Fifth Circuit analyzed the ad-
missibility of a hearsay urinalysis report in a revocation hearing and over-
ruled Caldera, noting that after Caldera, most courts applied a balancing
test that weighed a releasee's interest in confrontation with "the govern-
ment's good cause for denying [confrontation], particularly focusing on
the 'indicia of reliability' of a given hearsay statement." 220 The court
found that the balancing test was supported by the Supreme Court's dicta
211. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310.
212. Id. at 317-21.
213. See United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1117 (5th Cir. 1989).
214. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 332 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Bullcoming,
131 S. Ct. at 2709-10; Melendez-Diaz, 527 U.S. at 310.
215. 631 F.2d 1227, 1228 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. (citing United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)).
219. 918 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1990).
220. Id. at 486 (quoting Farrish v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 836 F.2d 969, 978 (5th Cir.
1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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in Scarpelli and Morrissey and the Advisory Committee Notes for Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.221 While the Fifth Circuit cited to legal
authority that stemmed from the Fourteenth Amendment due process
confrontation right, the court still continued to invoke the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause. 222 It specifically ruled that the admission of
the report did not violate the Sixth Amendment and cited to other revo-
cation hearing cases that explicitly found no Sixth Amendment violation
in admitting urinalysis reports through a probation officer. 2 2 3 The court
appeared to equate the due process right to confrontation in revocation
proceedings with the Sixth Amendment confrontation right 2 2 4
The influence of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in revo-
cation proceedings was still evident five years later in another case that
examined the admissibility of a hearsay urinalysis report in a supervised
release revocation hearing.225 While acknowledging that a releasee's right
to confrontation stemmed from due process requirements as evidenced
by Morrissey and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, the court nev-
ertheless directly relied on Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence to apply a harmless error analysis. 226 The court explained that
"[a]lleged violations of the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo,
but are subject to a harmless error analysis." 227
However, after Crawford and its progeny created a stricter test for tes-
timonial hearsay evidence- and forensic laboratory reports specifi-
cally-the Fifth Circuit changed its tune regarding the place of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause in revocation hearings.228 For exam-
ple, after Melendez-Diaz held that certificates of forensic laboratory re-
sults are testimonial and therefore subject to Crawford's standards, the
Fifth Circuit clearly differentiated the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to confrontation. 229 In Minnit, the Fifth Circuit held
that "Melendez-Diaz interprets a defendant's right to confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment in a criminal prosecution, not the limited due
process right to confrontation afforded a defendant in a revocation pro-
ceeding." 230 Even though the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the influ-
ence of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in revocation
proceedings was permissible, the court refused to actually apply any prin-
ciples from the Sixth Amendment case Melendez-Diaz.231 Even factual
and legal principles in Melendez-DiaZ that were not tied exclusively to
221. Id. at 486-87.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 487 (citing United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644-45 (8th Cir.1986); United
States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762, 766 (11th Cir.1983)).
224. See id.
225. See United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1995).
226. See id. at 221.
227. Id. at 219 & n.6 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 113
(11th Cir. 1994); Kindred, 918 F.3d at 488).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2010).
229. See, e.g., id.; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009).
230. Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 333 n.3 (emphasis added).
231. See id.
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the Sixth Amendment, such as the usefulness of cross-examination in
light of documented errors in the forensic reports and the fact that the
reports were not traditional "business records," failed to cross the divide
to influence confrontation-rights analysis in revocation proceedings. 232
For example, in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court expressly noted
some benefits of cross-examining the analyst who prepared the forensic
reports.233 These benefits were not tied exclusively to the Sixth Amend-
ment.234 The Supreme Court stated that confrontation "assur[es] accurate
forensic analysis," especially since the analyses may be fraudulent or in-
competent, with a "lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment." 235
Confrontation also assures accurate forensic analysis in an environment
where "[a] forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforce-
ment official may feel pressure-or have an incentive-to alter the evi-
dence in a manner favorable to the prosecution." 2 3 6 Furthermore,
confrontation helps obtain accurate forensic analysis in an environment
of "wide variability across forensic science disciplines with regard to tech-
niques, methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors,
research, general acceptability, and published material." 237 The
Melendez-Diaz Court learned of such benefits through factual studies
that highlighted the unreliability of forensic tests.238 In light of these fac-
tual studies, the Supreme Court concluded that "there is little reason to
believe that confrontation will be useless in testing analysts' honesty, pro-
ficiency, and methodology." 2 39
After Melendez-Diaz, one would expect courts to acknowledge that
there would be some benefit to allowing a releasee to confront the crea-
tor of a forensic laboratory report in any proceeding, especially in light of
the independent research studies relied on by the Supreme Court.240 But
232. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320-21; Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 334-35.
233. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320-21.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 318-20.
236. Id. at 318.
237. Id. at 320-21 (quoting COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC Scis.
CMTY., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 6-7 [hereinafter NAT'L ACADEMY REPORT] (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
238. Id. at 318-20. The Court referred to a recent study by the National Research
Council of the National Academies, which "discuss[ed] problems of subjectivity, bias, and
unreliability of common forensic tests" and conclud[ed] that "[tihe forensic science system,
encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that can only be addressed
by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure that supports the forensic science
community in this country." Id. at 319, 321 (quoting NAT'L ACADEMY REPORT, supra note
237, at P-1) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also cited a study that con-
cluded that in a "study of cases in which exonerating evidence resulted in the overturning
of criminal convictions[,] . . . invalid forensic testimony contributed to the convictions in
60% of the cases." Id. at 319 (citing Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Foren-
sic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009)).
239. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321.
240. See id at 318-21. Recently news reports have continued to show the need to test
the reliability of forensic test results. See, e.g., Sally Jacobs, Annie Dookhan Pursued Re-
nown Along a Path of Lies, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2013/02/03/chasing-renown-path-paved-with-lies/Axw3AxwmD33lRwXatSvMCL/
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the Fifth Circuit refused to allow Melendez-Diaz to have any such im-
pact.241 In analyzing the releasee's interest in confrontation, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Minnitt held that the releasee's interest in cross-examination about
a scientific fact was "minimal because the truth of the fact [could] best be
'verified through the methods of science' rather than 'through the rigor of
cross-examination.' 2 4 2 In light of the factual findings in Melendez-Diaz
about the unreliability of forensic tests and the clear benefits of cross-
examination, the Fifth Circuit's statement that such forensic reports were
best "'verified through the methods of science' rather than 'through the
rigor of cross-examination" 243 was outdated and unsupported. 244
The Fifth Circuit also refused to allow Melendez-Diaz to exert any in-
fluence when analyzing whether the Government showed good cause for
denying confrontation. 245 In evaluating whether the report had sufficient
indicia of reliability (one of the factors in the good cause analysis), the
Fifth Circuit stated that "[a]lthough urinalysis reports are 'not so inher-
ently reliable as to be automatically admissible,' they are regular business
records and therefore bear 'substantial indicia of reliability.' 2 4 6 How-
ever, in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court expressly held that such labo-
ratory reports do not qualify as traditional business records because "the
regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use
at trial."247 This finding was based not only on Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence but also on civil law. 2 4 8
One would expect this reasoning that forensic reports are not business
reports to trickle down to the analysis of all forensic laboratory reports,
regardless of whether they are examined in the revocation proceeding
context or criminal trials. However, the Fifth Circuit refused to allow
Melendez-Diaz, a Sixth Amendment case, to exert any such influence in
the revocation hearing context.249 Again, in United States v. Delbosque,
the Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that neither Melendez Diaz nor
Bullcoming, both Sixth Amendment cases, applied in revocation
story.html (discussing forensic analyst Annie Dookhan's close relationship with prosecu-
tors, and her production of fraudulent test results, including intentionally contaminating
samples); Joseph Goldstein, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 11, 2013, at Al (stating examples of lab tech-
nician's mishandling of DNA evidence in rape cases).
241. See United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 2010).
242. Id. (quoting United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 1995)) (em-
phasis added).
243. Id. (quoting McCormick, 54 F.3d at 222).
244. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318-21.
245. See Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 334.
246. Id. (quoting McCormick, 54 F.3d at 223-24; United States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d
485, 487 (5th Cir. 1990)).
247. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321-22.
248. See id The Court relied in part on Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), a civil
matter in which the Court held that "an accident report provided by an employee of a
railroad company did not qualify as a business record because, although kept in the regular
course of the railroad's operations, it was 'calculated for use essentially in the court, not in
the business."' Id. at 321 (quoting Palmer, 318 U.S. at 114). "The analysts' certificates-
like police reports generated by law enforcement officials-[did] not qualify as business or
public records for precisely the same reason." Id. at 321-22.
249. See Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 333 n.3.
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hearings.250
The Fifth Circuit's present-day treatment of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause when analyzing due process confrontation rights in
revocation hearings contrasts sharply with its earlier treatment of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 251 Now, even principles that are
independent of the Sixth Amendment are excluded from revocation hear-
ings.2 5 2 However, in the past, the Fifth Circuit has mistakenly equated the
due process confrontation right with the Sixth Amendment right.253
B. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The Eighth Circuit also relied on Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause principles to determine confrontation rights in revocation pro-
ceedings after Roberts, but it cut ties with the Sixth Amendment after
Crawford.254 In United States v. Bell, the Eighth Circuit held that the ad-
mission of urinalysis laboratory reports in a revocation hearing did not
violate a probationer's due process right to confrontation, relying on
Morrissey, Gagnon, and, erroneously, the Sixth Amendment.255 The
Eighth Circuit stated that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
did apply in revocation hearings and that "it must be honored unless the
findings necessary to avoid it are made." 256 This finding may have come
from the Eighth Circuit's incorrect view that Morrissey interpreted the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in revocation hearings, when in
actuality, Morrissey interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment confronta-
tion right.257 Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
raised no red flags for the Eighth Circuit in addressing a probationer's
right to confrontation in a probation revocation hearing.258
Three years later, in United States v. Burton, the Eighth Circuit relied
on its decision in Bell to find that a probationer's right to confrontation
was not violated when hearsay urinalysis laboratory reports were admit-
ted against him.259 Although this time, the Eighth Circuit avoided stating
that the Sixth Amendment directly applied, it borrowed language from
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause cases. 2 6 0 For example, the court
cited to Bell's language that such laboratory reports bore "substantial in-
dicia of reliability." 261 The Bell court in turn had relied on United States v.
250. United States v. Delbosque, 463 F. App'x 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
251. Compare Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 333, with McCormick, 54 F.3d at 219.
252. See Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 333-35.
253. See United States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1990).
254. Compare United States v. Redd, 318 F.3d 778, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2003), with United
States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 2004).
255. See United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 641-45 (8th Cir. 1986).
256. Id. at 643 n.3.
257. See United States v. Burton, 866 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (8th Cir. 1989); Bell, 785 F.2d
at 642.
258. See Bell, 785 F.2d at 645.
259. Burton, 866 F.2d at 1059-60 (8th Cir. 1989).
260. See id. at 1059.
261. Id. (quoting Bell, 785 F.2d at 643).
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Penn,262 which erroneously held that the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause directly applied to revocation hearings. 263
In United States v. Redd, shortly before Crawford was decided, the
Eighth Circuit again applied the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
in a revocation proceeding in which the releasee argued that the introduc-
tion of hearsay test results and chain-of-custody reports for six sweat
patches that tested positive for drugs violated his right to confronta-
tion.2M The Eighth Circuit directly addressed the releasee's argument
that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right
and concluded that no such violation occurred. 265 The court also relied
directly on Sixth Amendment cases, such as United States v. Baker, to find
that such reports were "normally understood to be reliable" and had
"greater indicia of reliability than oral hearsay." 266
Once the Supreme Court decided Crawford, the Eighth Circuit finally
distinguished the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation from the Four-
teenth Amendment right to confrontation in revocation hearings.267 In
United States v. Martin, the court held that the Sixth Amendment con-
frontation right in criminal prosecutions did not apply to supervised re-
lease revocation proceedings because the revocation proceedings are not
part of a criminal prosecution. 268 It expressly acknowledged the "limited
due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses in a
revocation hearing" and held that Crawford, which "involv[ed] the con-
tours of the confrontation right in criminal prosecutions, "did not apply in
revocation proceedings. 269 Although the Martin court addressed the ad-
missibility of a rape victim's out-of-court statements and not forensic lab-
oratory reports, it was only after Crawford that the Eighth Circuit finally
and clearly separated the due process right to confrontation from the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 270
C. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Eleventh Circuit's treatment of the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause in revocation proceedings followed a similar trajectory as the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits.271 In the early 1980s, in United States v. Penn,
the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether a releasee's right to confrontation
was denied in a revocation hearing when the trial court admitted a hear-
262. Bell, 785 F.2d at 642.
263. See United States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762, 764 (11th Cir. 1983).
264. United States v. Redd, 318 F.3d 778, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2003).
265. Id. at 782, 785.
266. Id. at 784 (citing United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1988)).
267. See United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2004).
268. Id. at 844 n.4.
269. Id. at 844 & n.4.
270. See id. at 844. The Eighth Circuit has yet to decide a case determining the admissi-
bility of hearsay forensic laboratory reports in revocation proceedings since Crawford.
271. Compare United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2010), and Mar-
tin, 382 F.3d at 844, with United States v. Morris, 140 F. App'x 138, 143 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam).
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say laboratory report that showed a positive test for drugs. 272 The Elev-
enth Circuit freely applied principles from Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause cases, such as Roberts.273 The court held that con-
ventional substitutes for hearsay like affidavits, depositions, and docu-
mentary evidence "tend to bear the 'indicia of reliability' upon which the
Court has focused in the related context of determining whether a given
hearsay statement should be admissible in a criminal trial." 274
The Penn court also mistakenly stated that the Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause directly applied in revocation hearings.275 Rather than
finding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provided
the right to confrontation in revocation proceedings, the court incorrectly
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause in revocation hearings. 276 Even though the
Eleventh Circuit also cited to Morrissey and Gagnon and distinguished
revocation proceedings from criminal trials, it nevertheless failed to rec-
ognize that the right to confrontation in revocation proceedings stems not
from the Sixth Amendment but the Fourteenth Amendment. 277
Like its sister courts, the Eleventh Circuit's view of the influence of the
Sixth Amendment in revocation proceedings changed after Crawford.278
Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to decide a case directly involving
forensic laboratory reports in a revocation hearing after Crawford, in a
case involving the admissibility of forensic laboratory results at a sentenc-
ing hearing, the court discussed in dicta that the Crawford right to con-
frontation is only a criminal trial right and that in revocation hearings, the
right to confrontation is determined by a balancing test.2 7 9 Furthermore,
in other cases analyzing the admissibility of hearsay evidence in revoca-
tion proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that neither Craw-
ford nor the Sixth Amendment applies.280 For example, in United States v.
Morris, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation is specifically limited to 'criminal prosecutions.' The Su-
272. United States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762, 766 (11th Cir. 1983).
273. Id. at 765.
274. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-68 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality
opinion)).
275. See id. at 764.
276. Id.
277. See id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 847-48 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (finding that trial court did not violate releasee's Sixth Amendment right to con-
frontation in revocation hearing when it admitted hearsay testimony of probation officer
who received information form unnamed sources linking releasee to shootings and drug-
related crimes).
278. Compare Penn, 721 F.2d at 766, with United States v. Morris, 140 F. App'x 138,
143 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), and United States v. Geathers, 297 F. App'x 885, 886
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); compare United States v. Redd, 318 F.3d 778, 784-85 (8th
Cir. 2003), with United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2004); compare United
States v. Caldera, 631 F.2d 1227, 1228 (5th Cir. 1980), with United States v. Minnitt, 617
F.3d 327, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2010).
279. See United States v. Melvin, 241 F. App'x 692, 696-97 (11th Cir. 2007).
280. See, e.g., Morris, 140 F. App'x at 143.
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preme Court previously has held that the revocation of parole is not part
of a criminal prosecution." 2 8 1 Again, in United States v. Geathers, the
court emphatically stated, "No authority extends the Sixth Amendment
right to confront adverse witnesses to supervised release revocation
proceedings." 2 8 2
Relying on Geathers, the Southern District of Florida in United States v.
Hathaway held that the admission of laboratory test results in a super-
vised release revocation hearing did not deny a releasee's confrontation
rights.283 The court found that the Sixth Amendment cases, like Craw-
ford, were simply inapplicable in revocation hearings.284 It found that the
releasee's "[rieliance on Crawford [was] misplaced, because that holding
interprets rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, which has not
been interpreted to apply to supervised release revocation
proceedings." 2 8 5
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has made its position clear: there is no room
for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in revocation
proceedings.
D. OTHER COURTS
This changing relationship between the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment confrontation right in revo-
cation hearings is also evident in other courts. For example, before
Crawford, the Seventh Circuit had no qualms about relying on Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause cases to analyze the due process right
to confrontation in revocation proceedings.286 In United States v. Pierre,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the admission of laboratory reports in a revo-
cation proceeding without the necessity of cross-examination by relying
in part on a Sixth Amendment criminal case finding medical records
reliable.287
Although the Seventh Circuit has not directly examined the admissibil-
ity of laboratory reports in revocation proceedings since Crawford,
Melendez-Diaz, or Bullcoming, in analyzing other hearsay evidence after
Crawford, the Seventh Circuit has clearly separated the two confronta-
tion rights.288 For example, in United States v. Kelley, the Seventh Circuit
held that "Crawford changed nothing with respect to revocation hear-
ings" because Morrissey "held unequivocally that revocation hearings are
not 'criminal prosecutions' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment." 289
281. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)) (citations omitted).
282. Geathers, 297 F. App'x at 886.
283. United States v. Hathaway, No. 08-80077-CR-Hurley, 2011 WL 5320985, at *1-3
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 5295318 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2011).
284. Id. at *2.
285. Id. (quoting Geathers, 297 F. App'x at 886) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 47 F.3d 241, 242-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
287. Id.
288. See United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006).
289. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
SMU LAW REVIEW
This is not to say that all courts made drastic changes after Crawford
and its progeny. For example, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have consist-
ently relied exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to confrontation, the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, or both to
determine whether the admission of a hearsay forensic test denies a
releasee's right to confrontation. 290
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. McCallum (just two years after
Roberts was decided) ruled that a releasee's right to confront a witness
was not denied when a report showing a positive test for marijuana was
used against him. 2 9 1 The Fourth Circuit relied exclusively on Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32.1 to conclude that the releasee's confrontation
right was not denied.292 Nearly two decades later, after Melendez-Diaz
was issued, the Fourth Circuit again analyzed the admissibility of a posi-
tive drug report under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, but this
time held that the releasee's confrontation rights were denied.293
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has consistently looked to the due process
right to confrontation and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 to
determine the admissibility of hearsay forensic reports against releasees
in revocation proceedings.294
Regardless of whether courts have wavered in their application of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to revocation hearings or they
have consistently held that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
does not apply, it is clear that after the Supreme Court announced its
game-changing rule in Crawford regarding the admissibility of testimo-
nial hearsay evidence, all federal circuit courts have taken a clear stance
that neither Crawford nor the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
has any material bearing on the Fourteenth Amendment confrontation
right in revocation proceedings. 295
The next part of this Article questions the current approach. While
there are good reasons to keep the two confrontation rights completely
separate, there are stronger reasons for the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause to have more influence and impact in analyzing a releasee's
due process right to confrontation in revocation proceedings.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 310-14 (9th Cir. 1993).
291. United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1025-27 (4th Cir. 1982).
292. Id. at 1025-26.
293. Doswell, 670 F.3d at 531.
294. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 526 F.3d 543, 548-50 (9th Cir. 2008); Martin, 984
F.2d at 309-14.
295. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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V. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
SHOULD HAVE MORE INFLUENCE OVER THE DUE
PROCESS CONFRONTATION RIGHT IN
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
In this part, the Article analyzes whether the Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause should have greater influence over the Fourteenth
Amendment due process confrontation right in revocation proceedings.
There are four general reasons that courts and advocates keep the two
confrontation rights separate: (1) the rights stem from distinct constitu-
tional amendments; 2 9 6 (2) revocation proceedings are different from
criminal prosecutions; 297 (3) a majority of courts currently believe that
the two rights should be kept distinct;298 and (4) an undue burden on the
government would result if Confrontation Clause principles were
adopted in revocation proceedings.
While each of these reasons may have some validity, there are stronger
counter-arguments to allow Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
principles to directly apply-or, at the least, have a greater influence-in
revocation proceedings.299 As the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to confrontation share the same ancient roots, the main purpose of
confrontation-to determine the reliability of testimonial statements-
should be evident in revocation proceedings as it is in criminal prosecu-
tions. Also, while in the past, revocation proceedings and criminal prose-
cutions may have been distinct, they now share such similar procedures
and purpose that the Sixth Amendment should directly apply in revoca-
tion proceedings or, at a minimum, have more influence. Lastly, constitu-
tional concerns trump majority rule or any potential hardship on the
government.
A. SEPARATE AMENDMENTS VS. ANCIENT RoOTS AND
SAME AMENDMENT
1. Separate Amendments
Lower courts keep the two confrontation rights separate because, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, they stem from different amendments-
the Sixth and Fourteenth.300 Courts have relied on the different language
296. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); Salinger v. United States, 272
U.S. 542, 548 (1926).
297. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
298. See United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2005).
299. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973).
300. See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 482; United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327,
333 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not
apply in revocation proceedings because the Sixth Amendment applies to a defendant's
right to confrontation in a criminal prosecution and a defendant has a "limited due process
right to confrontation in revocation proceedings"); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840,
844 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that there is a "limited due process right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses in a revocation hearing" and that Crawford, which
"involv[ed] the contours of the confrontation right in criminal prosecutions, [therefore did]
not apply" in revocation proceedings).
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and purposes of the two amendments to justify distinct standards for each
right.301
The language of the Sixth Amendment provides that the Confrontation
Clause applies to statements against the accused in all criminal prosecu-
tions.302 The Sixth Amendment proclaims that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor." 303 According to the Supreme Court, the right to confronta-
tion in revocation proceedings, however, arises not from the Sixth
Amendment but from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
which prohibits the government from "depriv[ing] any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." 304
Assuming courts continue to view the right to confrontation in revoca-
tion proceedings as arising from the Fourteenth Amendment instead of
the Sixth Amendment, the distinct purposes of each Amendment may
justify a separate jurisprudence for each right. Courts have carved out a
unique purpose for the Sixth Amendment. 305 Recently, there is an "in-
creasingly common presumption" that the primary basis of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause is to prevent prosecutors from using
ex parte witness examinations in criminal trials, such as those presented
against Sir Walter Raleigh in the 1600s.30 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court
cited to Sir Walter Raleigh's trial in Crawford.307Arguably, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation does not have a similar
purpose. Sir Walter Raleigh was not mentioned in Morrissey or Ga-
gnon.308 Nor did the Court state in Morrissey or Gagnon that the primary
purpose of confrontation in revocation proceedings is to prevent the gov-
ernment from using civil ex parte witnesses in quasi-criminal revocation
proceedings. 309
However, this rationale regarding the different language and purposes
of each amendment only holds if courts continue to ignore two very sig-
nificant truths. First, these two amendments share the same historical
roots of "confrontation,"310 and second, the idea that revocations are not
301. See, e.g., Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 333; Martin, 382 F.3d at 844; Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 497 (1959).
302. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
303. Id.
304. See id. amend. XIV, § 1; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 ("By whatever name, the lib-
erty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."). The Due Process Clause, however, does not necessarily involve the right to
confrontation. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-68 (1974). For example, in
Wolff, although the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause applied to prisoner
disciplinary cases, the rights to confrontation and cross-examination were not included. Id.
The Court observed that "[c]onfrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards
to institutional interests." Id. at 567.
305. See Smith, supra note 57, at 1505-06.
306. Id.
307. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-45 (2004).
308. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471.
309. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778; Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471.
310. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959).
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really a part of "criminal prosecutions" lacks support, especially in mod-
em times.311
2. Same Ancient Roots
First, the right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment share the same "ancient roots," dating back more
than two thousand years.312 This fundamental right to confrontation is
not limited solely to criminal trials and revocation proceedings but also
applies to certain civil proceedings. 313
In Greene v. McElroy, the Supreme Court explained why the right to
confrontation is required in certain hearings, even civil ones.314 The
Court held:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our juris-
prudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends
on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case
must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to
show that it is untrue. . . . We have formalized these protections in
the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have
ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which
provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This Court has
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out
not only in criminal cases but also in all types of cases where admin-
istrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.315
The "ancient roots" of confrontation trace back to biblical times when
Festus reported to King Agrippa that the priests and elders wanted the
apostle Paul to face judgment. 316 Festus reminded the King: "It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is
accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer for
himself concerning the crime laid against him."317
The ancient roots of confrontation were highlighted again in Craw-
ford.3 18 There, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he right to confront
one's accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times." 319 And
early Supreme Court cases also recognized that common law, rather than
311. See Richard W. Alexander, Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole
Revocation: A Policy Appraisal, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1115, 1129 (1976).
312. Greene, 360 U.S. at 497 & n.25.
313. Id.
314. Id. This is not to imply that confrontation is required in all contexts. See supra note
304.
315. Greene, 360 U.S. at 496-97 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
316. Id. at 496 n.25.
317. Id. (quoting Acts 25:16) (internal quotation marks omitted).
318. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
319. Id. (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988); Frank R. Herrmann, S.J. &
Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confron-
tation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 (1994).
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the Sixth Amendment, created the right to confrontation.320
Although the Court in Morrissey and Gagnon did not identify the his-
torical roots and reasons for the right to confrontation under the Four-
teenth Amendment in revocation proceedings, 321 it is clear from the
Supreme Court's reasoning in other cases that the general concept of con-
frontation dates back to ancient times.322 Given that the Sixth Amend-
ment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-
examination started from the same source, it is illogical that the modern
definitions and tests for confrontation are so different.
In the Sixth Amendment context, except in limited circumstances, the
only way for courts to determine the reliability of testimonial hearsay
evidence is to test the evidence "in the crucible of cross-examination." 3 2 3
As Professor Amar observed, "The deep principles underlying the Sixth
Amendment[ ] . . . are the protection of innocence and the pursuit of
truth"; the "[m]odern Supreme Court case law has exuberantly echoed
[William] Blackstone . . . , defining the 'Confrontation Clause's very mis-
sion' as promoting 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process in crim-
inal trials'; and labeling cross-examination the 'greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth."'324 In other words, confrontation
and cross-examination are necessary steps to finding hearsay evidence re-
liable. A judicial determination of reliability was rejected as loathsome by
the Framers.325 However, in the Fourteenth Amendment context, a judi-
cial determination of reliability of hearsay evidence plays a pivotal role in
determining whether confrontation or cross-examination is required in
revocation proceedings. 326 Therefore, while the two rights to confronta-
tion share the same ancient roots, the modern day definitions are mutu-
ally exclusive. Courts still hold fast to the overruled and rejected
definition and principles of confrontation in revocation proceedings
merely because Crawford is a Sixth Amendment case and they overlook
the fact that these two rights share the same ancient roots.327
320. See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926) ("The right of confron-
tation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was a common-law
right having recognized exceptions.").
321. See Gragnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). Justice Douglas in his dissent in Morrissey did point to the "ancient roots" of con-
frontation and cross-examination and relied on the Court's language from Greene v. McEl-
roy to support his proposition that confrontation with the informer may be necessary in
some revocation hearings. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 497 n.9, 498-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)).
322. See, e.g., Greene, 360 U.S. at 497 & n.25.
323. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
324. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641, 642,
689-90 (1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985);
California v. Greene, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). But see Roger C. Park, Is Confrontation the
Bottom Line?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 459, 467 (2007) ("I cannot demonstrate conclusively
that it is better to identify underlying goals than merely to say that 'the purpose of confron-
tation is confrontation."').
325. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
326. See supra Part III.
327. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see also, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688,
689 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Barraza, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1035 (S.D. Cal 2004).
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In fact, until Crawford, the two Amendments actually had great influ-
ence over each other. 328 For example, Professor Westen observed that the
"indicia of reliability" standard linked to the Confrontation Clause in the
Roberts era derived not from the Confrontation Clause but from the Due
Process Clause, which in general, "prohibits the state ... from using any
single item of evidence against a defendant which is inherently too unreli-
able for rational evaluation by the jury."329 Part IV of this Article also
gave examples of how before Crawford, courts were much more willing
to rely on Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause principles in revoca-
tion proceedings.330
Since the time that courts have rejected Crawford's applicability in rev-
ocation hearings, odd outcomes have resulted from courts applying dif-
ferent tests in different contexts.331 As the dissenting judges in the Ninth
Circuit observed in Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, the court may, in certain
circumstances, give a more expansive confrontation right to releasees in
revocation proceedings than a defendant in criminal trials for the same
exact type of hearsay evidence. 332 The greater right to confrontation in
revocation proceedings is contrary to the Supreme Court's guiding princi-
ple that criminal defendants enjoy more rights than releasees in revoca-
tion proceedings.333
In the example set forth in Valdivia, in a criminal trial, a defendant
would have no right to confront a domestic abuse victim's statements to a
911 operator while an emergency is taking place because such statements
would be considered nontestimonial.334 The evidence would be admitted
as an excited utterance under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2).335
However, in a revocation proceeding, those same statements would
only be admissible if the Ninth Circuit found that the government showed
sufficient good cause to dispense with the releasee's right, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to confront the domestic abuse victim. 3 3 6 In
other words, because the right to confrontation in revocation proceedings
is available to all hearsay evidence, not just testimonial hearsay evidence,
the government has a higher burden to dispense with the right to con-
328. See Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 598-600 (1978).
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541
U.S. 36; supra Part IV.
331. See, e.g., Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 623 F.3d 849, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J.,
dissenting).
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) ("We begin with the pro-
position that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole
revocations.").
334. See Valdivia, 623 F.3d at 851 (Bea, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547




frontation. 337 Namely, the government's showing of good cause for deny-
ing confrontation must outweigh the releasee's right and interest in
confrontation. 338
In fact, anytime a court or hearing officer applies the reliability test or
federal balancing test to nontestimonial hearsay evidence in a revocation
hearing, the right to confrontation in a revocation proceeding would be
more expansive than the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation be-
cause the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-
testimonial hearsay evidence in criminal trials.339 In sum, the divide
between the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment right to confrontation in revocation proceedings may lead to
circumstances where the releasees have a more expansive right to con-
frontation than criminal defendants. 340
3. Same Amendment
Courts have failed to give convincing reasons why revocation proceed-
ings are not a continuation of criminal prosecutions and why the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause should not directly apply in revoca-
tion proceedings.
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court announced that parole revocation
hearings are not part of criminal prosecutions:
Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including im-
position of sentence. Supervision is not directly by the court but by
an administrative agency, which is sometimes an arm of the court
and sometimes of the executive. Revocation deprives an individual,
not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only
of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of spe-
cial parole restrictions. 341
In Gagnon, the Court cited to this justification to find that probation rev-
ocation is "not a stage of a criminal prosecution." 3 4 2
However, as discussed in more detail in the next section, revocation
proceedings share many key similarities with traditional criminal prosecu-
tions.343 Revocation proceedings look like criminal trials, and the govern-
ment actually has to prove a new violation for probation, parole, or
supervised release to be revoked.344 These proceedings differ from sen-
tencing hearings, where the Sixth Amendment does not apply, because
unlike a sentencing hearing where courts already know that the defen-
dant is guilty, in revocation hearings a new violation must be found. 345 As
337. See id. at 851-52.
338. See id. at 851.
339. See id. at 852.
340. Id. at 850-51.
341. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
342. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480).
343. See infra Part V.B.2.
344. See Alexander, supra note 311, at 1129.
345. See id. at 1123 & n.57.
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explained in the next section, a revocation hearing is arguably a continua-
tion of a criminal prosecution, and, therefore, the Sixth Amendment
should directly apply in revocation proceedings or, at the very least, have
much more influence than it does now. 34 6
B. DIFFERENT PROCEEDINGS VS. RELATED PROCEEDINGS
1. Different Proceedings
Another common reason courts give for keeping the two confrontation
rights separate is that a revocation proceeding is not a criminal prosecu-
tion, and, therefore, releasees are not entitled to the same rights as crimi-
nal defendants. 347 As the Supreme Court held in Morrissey, "the
revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to
parole revocations." 3 4 8 This principle was so important that it was the
starting and ending point of the Court's analysis in Morrissey.349
On the basis of this principle, courts have held over and over again,
especially after Crawford, that Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
principles are not to be extended to releasees in revocation proceed-
ings.350 In Gagnon, the Supreme Court noted the main differences be-
tween the criminal prosecutions and revocation hearings.351 According to
the Court, a prosecutor represents the state in criminal trials, but in revo-
cation proceedings, a parole officer with specific qualities represents the
state.352 Furthermore, in criminal trials, formal rules of evidence apply,
and defendants' procedural rights are waived if not timely raised. 353 By
contrast, in revocation hearings, formal procedures and rules of evidence
are not used. 3 5 4 Additionally, in jury trials, defendants are required to
make their case "understandable to untrained jurors."355 In revocation
hearings, though, "the members of the hearing body are familiar with the
problems and practice of probation or parole." 356 In sum, the Gagnon
346. See infra Part V.B.2.
347. See, e.g., United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2005).
348. Morrissey v. Brewer, 480 U.S. 471, 408 (1972).
349. Id. ("We begin with the proposition . . . ."); id. at 489 ("We emphasize there is no
thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any
sense."); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) ("[R]evocation of parole is
not a part of a criminal prosecution.").
350. See, e.g., United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Justice, 430 F. App'x 274, 227 (5th Cir. 2011); Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 984,
989 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006); Rondeau, 430
F.3d at 47 ("The Supreme Court has long recognized that a parole revocation hearing,
which for present purposes is analogous to a supervised release hearing, is not equivalent
to 'a criminal prosecution.' Therefore, 'the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a
proceeding does not apply to parole revocations."') (citations omitted).
351. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788-89 (listing these differences in the context of determining
whether the right to counsel existed in revocation proceedings).






Court characterized a criminal trial as "an adversary proceeding with its
own unique characteristics."35 7
2. Related Proceedings
In modern day, however, many revocation proceedings, particularly
probation and supervised release revocation proceedings, no longer por-
tray the key characteristics that the Gagnon Court observed.358 For exam-
ple, it is not uncommon in supervised release and probation revocation
hearings for the prosecutor to represent the government. 359 While the
formal rules of evidence still may not apply in revocation proceedings, 360
there are formal procedural rules contained in the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure 361 and state law3 6 2 that apply in revocation proceedings.
Also, in revocation proceedings, it is not uncommon for the fact-finder
and decision-maker to be a judge, as is the case in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, where a jury is not present. 363 The defining characteristics
that set a criminal prosecution apart from a revocation proceeding, ac-
cording to Gagnon, are not as evident in the modern day.
As scholars have observed, the two proceedings are linked in pur-
pose.3 6 4 Many prosecutors have greater incentive to pursue a revocation
proceeding in place of a criminal trial due to the lesser burden of proof,
faster process, and, in some situations, a lengthier sentence.365 Also, as
357. Id.
358. See id. at 788-89.
359. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 463 F. Supp. 2d 551, 552 (E.D. Va. 2006) (proba-
tion revocation hearing); United States v. Barraza, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1031 (S.D. Cal.
2004) (supervised release revocation proceeding); United States v. Myers, 896 F. Supp.
1029, 1029 (D. Or. 1995).
360. See, e.g., Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 544 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that Federal
Rules of Evidence do not apply in parole revocation hearings); United States v. Frazier, 26
F.3d 110, 111 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding "that Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in
supervised release revocation hearings"); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776, 780
(7th Cir. 1980) (stating that "Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply [in probation revoca-
tion hearings] except for the rules of privilege").
361. FED. R. CRM. P. 32.1.
362. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 353-66 (2012) (terms and conditions for suspending or
revoking parole); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-3-9 (2012) (procedure for parole or supervised
release revocation hearings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2266 (2012) (procedure for probation
violations); 234 PA. CODE § 708 (regulations for court revocation of probation or parole
hearings).
363. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 616 F. Supp. 2d 102, 102 (D.D.C. 2009) (magis-
trate judge adjudicating probation revocation proceeding); United States v. Wolvin, 339 F.
Supp. 2d 1062, 1063 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (district court judge adjudicating supervised release
revocation hearing); United States v. Gravina, 906 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Mass. 1995) (district
court judge adjudicating supervised release revocation hearing); United States v. Middle-
ton, 815 F. Supp. 990, 991 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (district court judge adjudicating supervised
release revocation hearing); Summerford v. State, 728 S.E.2d 829, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
(reviewing superior court's revocation of releasee's probation); Cottingham v. State, 971
N.E.2d 82, 83 (Ind. 2012) (reviewing superior court's revocation of releasee's probation);
State v. Talbert, 727 S.E.2d 908, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (reviewing superior court's revo-
cation of releasee's probation).
364. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 311 at 1123, nn.57-58.
365. See id. Scott H. Ikeda, Probation Revocations as Delayed Dispositional Departures:
Why Blakely v. Washington Requires Jury Trials at Probation Violation Hearings, 24 LAW
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one scholar explained, "Morrissey rests on the assumption that parole is a
fundamentally different stage in the correctional process than imprison-
ment. Where imprisonment is punitive in nature, parole in Morrissey's
view is oriented toward rehabilitation." 3 6 6 However, as early as twenty
years after Morrissey, the scholar made a well-supported observation that
parole no longer served the primary goal of rehabilitation but had be-
come a "cost-effective means of extending the surveillance and discipline
of the penitentiary." 3 6 7
Lastly, another indication that revocation proceedings are more similar
to criminal prosecutions than what the Morrissey and Gagnon Courts en-
visioned is that other criminal-prosecution rights and principles have
crossed over to revocation proceedings after those two decisions were is-
sued.368 Two examples are the right to counsel and prosecutorial
immunity.369
In Gagnon, the key differences between the two proceedings resulted
in the Court ruling that there was no right to counsel in revocation hear-
ings and that counsel should only be granted "on a case-by-case basis."370
Notably, in 1972, the year Morrissey was decided, over twenty percent of
parole boards refused to allow the presence of even retained counsel at
parole revocation proceedings, and only twenty-six percent of the boards
appointed lawyers for the poor.3 71 Shortly after Gagnon, federal and
many state rule-makers granted releasees the right to counsel in revoca-
tion proceedings.372 Some courts have also erroneously held that the
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel applies in revocation
proceedings.373
& INEQ. 157, 157-58 (2006) (advocating jury trials in probation revocation proceeding be-
cause revocation proceedings are, arguably, the equivalent to durational departures in sen-
tencing proceedings where juries are required per Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004)); Sunny A. M. Koshy, Note, The Right of [All] the People to Be Secure: Extending
Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationers and Parolees, 39 HASTINGs L.J.
449, 450 n.7 (1988) (stating that the lighter burden of proof and the fewer required re-
sources prompt prosecutors to pursue probation revocation over prosecution); Shockley,
supra note 8, at 385-86 (observing that prosecutors are incentivized to pursue revocation
of supervised release rather than criminal prosecution of child pornography violations for
supervised releasees because the revocation can result in a heavier sentence before a judge,
whose standard is a preponderance of evidence, than before a jury, whose standard is be-
yond a reasonable doubt).
366. Bamonte, supra note 17, at 128 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-80
(1972)).
367. Id. at 132.
368. See infra notes 371, 374 and accompanying text.
369. See infra notes 371, 374 and accompanying text.
370. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-90 (1973).
371. Choper, supra note 17, at 133.
372. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b); Choper, supra note 17, at 134 (footnote omitted)
(observing that "Gagnon has led almost all jurisdictions to permit retained counsel as a
matter of course and has prompted a majority-including California, New York, and the
federal government-to provide appointed counsel without any showing of special need").
But see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 656 (2002) (noting that in Alabama, there is no
right to counsel in probation revocation hearings).
373. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 241 F. App'x 945, 946 (4th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (declining to consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a probation
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Furthermore, courts have applied principles of prosecutorial immunity,
available in criminal prosecutions, to prosecutors' involvement in revoca-
tion proceedings.374 For example, Professor Zacharias cites cases where
federal and state courts determined that prosecutors were immune from
conspiring to improperly revoke a releasee's probation and for causing a
defendant to be arrested for violating probation.375
Upon closer inspection, revocation proceedings share many similar
traits and goals with criminal prosecutions. These similarities should
prompt courts to re-examine whether a revocation proceeding is actually
a continuation of criminal prosecution and whether the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause should, therefore, directly apply. At the very
least, courts should allow the Sixth Amendment to have more influence
over the due process right to confrontation in these proceedings.
C. STATUS QUO VS. CHANGE
Courts have also kept the two confrontation rights separate because
every other federal appellate court that hears appeals of revocation pro-
ceedings has found that Crawford's interpretation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to confrontation does not apply in revocation proceedings.37 6
Even though there are individual judges who disagree with this view,377 it
is more difficult to argue that a legal principle should change when all
federal appellate courts agree on the principle.
But the mere fact that a majority of courts advocate one viewpoint
should not prevent change when compelling reasons demand otherwise.
It was only a few years ago that the Crawford Court recognized that the
Roberts rule did not adequately protect a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation regardless of whether all lower courts
were applying the Roberts rule. 3 7 8 Similarly, courts should not hesitate to
adopt Sixth Amendment confrontation principles in revocation hearings
revocation hearing on the grounds that such claims are not addressed in direct appeals but
in collateral proceedings); United States v. Lavanture, 74 F. App'x 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2003)
(same); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (conducting Strickland analysis to de-
termine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the differences between
Class A and Class B violations in supervised release revocation proceeding) (citing Strick-
land v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984)); Hambrick v. Brannen, 715 S.E.2d 89, 92 (Ga.
2011) (reversing district court's grant of habeas relief and finding that releasee did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel in probation revocation hearing under Strickland).
But see United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that there is
no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in supervised release revocation
proceedings).
374. Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58
VAND. L. REv. 171, 204-05 (2005).
375. Id. at 204 n.123 (citing Mosier v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 445 S.E.2d 535,
537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1987); Hamil-
ton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985)).
376. See supra note 200.
377. See, e.g., Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 623 F.3d 849, 850-54 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J.,
dissenting) (dissent from denial of rehearing).
378. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
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just because a majority of courts fail to do so. Constitutional concerns
always trump majority rule.
D. BURDEN TO GOVERNMENT VS. TAILORED SOLUTION
Separatists may also argue that the government would shoulder an un-
due burden if a standard closer to Crawford were required in revocation
hearings.379 In prior instances where courts considered expanding the
right to confrontation to new situations, the government inevitably raised
concerns about undue expense and difficulty.380 For example, when the
Supreme Court considered whether the due process right to confronta-
tion should be granted in probation revocation hearings, in addition to
parole revocation hearings, the Government argued that "serious practi-
cal problems" would arise in certain cases, especially with respect to "the
difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of
miles away."381
Also, in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause context, when the
Supreme Court weighed whether a criminal defendant had the right to
confront a technician who prepared certifications of forensic laboratory
results, numerous states submitted a joint amici brief in opposition that
highlighted the burden they would face if confrontation were required.382
They forecasted their future burden by presenting "the burden [they] cur-
rently face[d] without such a requirement." 3 8 3 These states concluded that
"[e]ven if only 5% of drug cases culminate[d] in trial, as long as the num-
ber of yearly drug arrests and analysis abides in the millions, the burden
on the States [would be] oppressive." 3 84
The National District Attorneys Association also stated that the ap-
pearance of the analysts who performed each test "would be physically
impossible." 38 5 It predicted that "the current criminal justice system
would effectively come to a standstill" and no defendant would plead
guilty without the analyst present in the courtroom. 386 Due to "the cur-
rent staffing levels and budgetary restrictions in states throughout the
country," the Association surmised "it w[ould] be highly unlikely that an
analyst w[ould] in fact be available to testify in every narcotics case." 387
379. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973).
380. See id.
381. Id.
382. See Brief of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 25-26,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4185394.
383. Id. For example, in 2006, 1,889,810 persons were arrested for narcotics crimes, and
1,935,788 substances were analyzed. Id. at 25. The states argued that if they were required
to produce technicians at trial, then their already-burdened system would become even
more difficult to manage. Id. at 25-26.
384. Id. at 25.
385. Brief of Nat'1 Dist. Attorneys Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent at 10, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 4185393.
386. Id. at 19.
387. Id.
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Similar concerns about the difficulties and expense of confrontation
were again raised when the Supreme Court considered a new issue-
whether surrogate analyst testimony was sufficient for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment. 388 In its amici brief, the New Mexico Department of
Health Scientific Laboratory Division pointed to the large numbers of
blood analyses and samples it reviews each year.3 8 9 State governments
again pointed to the difficulty that would result if the technician who ac-
tually tested the sample were required to testify.3 9 0
The real-world difficulty, burden, and expense that the government
spends in producing declarants at criminal trials would become even
greater if the same or similar Confrontation Clause standards were re-
quired in revocation hearings.
Although the concerns about the government's difficulty and expense
are valid, they again do not outweigh constitutional concerns. As the Su-
preme Court stated in Gagnon, "[s]ome amount of disruption inevitably
attends any new constitutional ruling."391 For this reason, courts should
not shy away from finding that the Sixth Amendment directly applies in
revocation proceedings.
However, even if courts were to continue to rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment as the basis for a releasee's confrontation right in revocation
proceedings, a new standard similar to the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause should be constructed. To prevent an undue burden on the
government, courts can still allow the standards to maintain one of the
most fundamental features of the due process confrontation right-flexi-
bility.3 9 2 Proposed modifications to the due process right to confrontation
in revocation proceedings are discussed in Part VI, the final part of this
Article.
388. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709 (2011).
389. Brief of N.M. Dep't of Health Scientific Lab. Div. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 27, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876), 2011 WL
175869. For example, the Department tested over 2500 blood samples in 2008 and over
3000 samples in 2010. Id. The four analysts at the department that analyzed blood alcohol
content for implied consent cases tested over 700 samples each year. Id.
390. Brief for California et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Bullcom-
ing v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876), 2011 WL 175867. To illustrate the
"unworkable alternative" of producing at trial every analyst who has tested a forensic sam-
ple, the states gave an example of a robbery prosecution in California where the prosecu-
tor "call[ed] all twelve forensic analysts who had participated in the batch processing of
DNA samples." Id. "One analyst spent more than twelve hours away from the laboratory
for approximately thirty minutes of testimony." Id.
391. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 n.5 (1973).
392. In Gagnon, the Supreme Court expressly allowed the introduction of alternatives
to live testimony, such as affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence, to abate the
government's concerns about the difficulty and expense of "procuring witnesses from per-
haps thousands of miles away." Id.
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VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION IN REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
First, as there is a strong argument that revocation proceedings are a
continuation of criminal prosecutions, rather than separate from criminal
prosecutions, the Sixth Amendment should apply directly to revocation
proceedings. In other words, the exact same standards for confrontation
in criminal trials should exist in revocation proceedings.
Second, even if revocation proceedings were not considered to be part
of a criminal prosecution, the standards for the Fourteenth Amendment
right to confrontation in revocation proceedings should change in three
ways to more closely mirror the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
First, a releasee's due process right to confrontation in revocation hear-
ings should only exist for testimonial hearsay evidence. Next, the current
tests used to analyze a releasee's confrontation right in revocation pro-
ceedings should be modified so that judges and hearing officers no longer
factor in the reliability of hearsay evidence in determining whether con-
frontation is necessary. Specifically, the federal reliability test should no
longer be employed, and minor adjustments to the federal balancing test
should be made so that the government's good-cause factor no longer
takes into consideration the reliability of the evidence.
These adjustments would not only bring the due process right to con-
frontation more in line with the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
but would leave most of the balancing test intact so that the confrontation
right can exhibit flexibility, a quintessential trait of the due process right.
A. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN REVOCATION
PROCEEDINGS: TESTIMONIAL-NONTESTIMONIAL FRAMEWORK
AND FLEXIBILITY
First, both confrontation rights should share the same framework.
Since under the current jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause, only testimonial hearsay evidence implicates the right to
confrontation. 393 Releasees likewise should only have a constitutional
right to confront witnesses who make testimonial statements against
them, unless the witness is unavailable and the releasee had a prior op-
portunity to examine the witness. 394
One clear benefit of having the same framework across both confronta-
tion rights is that if the Supreme Court were to change or clarify the defi-
nition of key terms or create completely new test for when a defendant
has the right to confront out-of-court declarants, the principles would eas-
ily be transferable to revocation proceedings. As an example, if one of
the many proposals to modify the definition of "testimonial" in the Con-
393. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004).
394. Id. at 68.
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frontation Clause context were adopted, 395 these principles would natu-
rally trickle down to revocation proceedings and ensure the consistency
of key legal principles between the two proceedings. Having the same
framework would prevent the inconsistent and odd results detailed in
Part V.A.2 of this Article.396 There would no longer be situations where
the government must satisfy a higher bar to present nontestimonial hear-
say evidence in revocation proceedings than to present the same nontesti-
monial hearsay evidence in criminal prosecutions.397
In addition to sharing the same framework as the Confrontation
Clause, the due process right to confrontation in revocation proceedings
should exhibit due process's key distinguishing trait-flexibility.398 As the
Morrissey Court observed, "[i]t has been said so often by this Court and
others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands." 399
While some have criticized the Due Process Clause as "amorphous," 400
"vague[,] ... unsound,.. . undemocratic," 4 0 1 and leaving decisions to the
"whim of men," 402 flexibility should not mean standardless. In fact, the
existing federal balancing test needs only slight modifications.
B. STANDARD FOR TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Currently, the two main tests used to analyze a releasee's right to con-
frontation in a revocation proceeding are the federal balancing test and
the reliability test.403 To follow the main directives of the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause, slight modifications should be made to the
federal balancing test, and the reliability test should be abolished.
As explained in Part III.A of this Article, the balancing test weighs a
releasee's right or interest to confrontation against the government's
good cause for denying the releasee's right to confrontation. 404 When the
releasee's right to confrontation outweighs the government's good cause,
then the hearsay evidence is not admissible. 405 However, if the govern-
395. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 88, at 590, 626-27 (advocating the res gestae approach
to determine which statements are testimonial, meaning that statements in which "the per-
son was narrating completed events to a person of authority" would be testimonial); Tom
Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 748-52 (2005); Scott
G. Stewart, Note, The Right of Confrontation, Ongoing Emergencies, and the Violent-Per-
petrator-at-Large Problem, 61 STAN. L. REV. 751, 778 (2008).
396. See supra Part V.A.2.
397. See supra Part V.A.2.
398. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
399. Id.
400. Lininger, supra note 17, at 289-90.
401. Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 711, 728 (1971).
402. Id.
403. See, e.g., United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2005).
404. See, e.g., Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 332-33.
405. Id.
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ment's good cause outweighs the releasee's right to confrontation, then
the hearsay evidence may be admitted in the revocation proceeding with-
out offending the releasee's due process right to confrontation. 406
Also, as described in Part III.B of this Article, the reliability test holds
that the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate a releasee's due
process right to confrontation as long as the hearsay evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable.407 There is no requirement that the government show
good cause for denying confrontation. 408
Since the Supreme Court in Crawford rejected any reliance on a judi-
cial determination of reliability to determine a defendant's right to con-
frontation in criminal prosecutions,409 the reliability test and similar state
tests that follow the reliability test should be abolished. These reliability
tests inherently depend on a judicial determination of whether the hear-
say evidence is reliable before granting or denying a releasee's right to
confrontation. 410
Next, the federal balancing test should be modified slightly so that
courts and hearing officers no longer look to the reliability of hearsay
evidence when examining the government's good cause for denying con-
frontation. Instead, when weighing a releasee's interest in confrontation
against the government's good cause, the only two factors considered
should be: (1) the releasee's interest in confrontation, and (2) good cause
evidence the government has shown to dispense with the releasee's right
to confrontation.
Courts should also apply clear standards for each of these factors to
avoid leaving decisions to "the whim of men." 411 As for the first factor-
the releasee's interest in confrontation-the three prong test set forth by
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Martin412 ensures that the releasee's
interest in confrontation is not easily overlooked. Courts and hearing of-
ficers should examine "the importance of the evidence to the court's ulti-
mate finding," 413 whether there is a complete denial of any other right to
confrontation, 414 and the consequences of finding a violation.415
The second factor-the government's good cause-should also have
more definite standards. The "good cause" standard should be restricted
to narrow situations, such that dispensing with a releasee's right to con-
frontation for testimonial hearsay evidence is difficult. For starters, the
exceptions carved out in Morrissey and Gagnon should apply: risk of
406. Id.
407. See, e.g., Kirby, 418 F.3d at 627-28.
408. Id.
409. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
410. See id.
411. Griswold, supra note 401, at 728.
412. 984 F.2d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1993).
413. Id. at 311.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 312. This third factor is not always considered. See, e.g., United States v.
Comito, 177 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999).
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harm to an informant 416 and great difficulty or expense to the govern-
ment, such as when a witness is thousands of miles away.417 Again, to
prevent courts and hearing officers from easily dispensing with the right
to confrontation, the government would be required to show actual proof
of harm, difficulty, or expense. In some situations, the hearsay testimonial
evidence may be so pivotal in the revocation hearing that no amount of
good cause should overcome the releasee's right to confrontation. 4 1 8 In
other words, courts must safeguard against any potential government
abuse by actually requiring the government to show proof or evidence of
good cause before dispensing with a releasee's right to confrontation.
One may argue this higher standard would be too burdensome to the
government. While the burden will likely increase, three safeguards pro-
mote its workability. First, this new standard would only apply to testimo-
nial hearsay evidence. As for all other, nontestimonial, hearsay evidence,
under the current Crawford standards, the government would no longer
have to show good cause for dispensing with the releasee's right to con-
frontation. 4 1 9 Second, statutory schemes like notice and demand statutes
where the government gives notice to the defendant of its intent to sub-
mit specific hearsay evidence and the defendant then has a period of time
to object to the evidence 420 could also be applied in revocation proceed-
ings. Because the Supreme Court has upheld such statutory schemes in
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause context, 4 2 1 similar statutes
should also be constitutional in the due process revocation proceeding
context. These statutes may provide more structure and advance notice in
upholding a releasee's confrontation right. Third, Supreme Court Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence, which provides the government with al-
ternative ways to produce evidence without denying a defendant's
confrontation rights, could also trickle down to revocation proceed-
ings. 422 For example, after the Supreme Court found in Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming that forensic laboratory results were testimonial hearsay
evidence, it then found in Williams v. Illinois that in limited circum-
stances, forensic results do not violate the Confrontation Clause if not
presented for the truth of the matter asserted, if not made for the purpose
of determining guilt, or if not "formal." 4 2 3 After Williams, forensic data
can be introduced in limited circumstances without violating a releasee's
due process right to confrontation. Future Supreme Court Confrontation
416. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
417. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1773).
418. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("But confrontation
with the informer may . . . be necessary for a fair hearing and the ascertainment of the
truth.").
419. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
420. For more information on notice and demand statutes and other ipse dixit statutes
see Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 481-84 (2006).
421. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325-26 (2009).
422. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235-41 (2012) (plurality opinion).
423. Id.; see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011); Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310.
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Clause cases clarifying how lower courts should manage a defendant's
right to confrontation could also trickle down to revocation proceedings.
C. STANDARD FOR NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY EVIDENCE
As for nontestimonial hearsay evidence in revocation proceedings,
releasees would no longer have the due process right to confront that
evidence just as criminal defendants do not have the Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation for nontestimonial hearsay evidence. 424 To guaran-
tee some protection against unreliable nontestimonial statements being
admitted in revocation proceedings, the same federal or state rules of evi-
dence pertaining to hearsay evidence that apply in criminal trials should
also apply in revocation proceedings.
This is not to say that the current Sixth Amendment-related rules for
nontestimonial hearsay (or even testimonial hearsay) should remain
static. Rather, there are strong arguments and proposals for allowing de-
fendants in criminal prosecutions to have some right to confront nontesti-
monial hearsay statements.425 Such proposals, if adopted in the Sixth
Amendment context, would then apply in revocation proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
After Crawford, courts have treated the Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion right more as a foe than as a friend of the due process right to con-
frontation in revocation proceedings. This must change. First, because the
government must prove a new violation in order to revoke parole, proba-
tion, or supervised release, and revocation proceedings share important
characteristics and goals with traditional criminal trials, it is arguable that
revocation proceedings are a continuation of criminal prosecutions and,
therefore, that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause should di-
rectly apply in revocation proceedings.
Second, even if courts still were to hold onto the view that revocation
proceedings are not part of criminal prosecutions, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process confrontation right must assimilate to the post-
Crawford definition of confrontation for three reasons. First, the Four-
teenth Amendment confrontation right is derived from the same ancient
roots as the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. Second, revocation
424. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
425. See, e.g., Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis and
Bockting, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 367, 370-72 (2007) (arguing that "[it was premature for
the Court" to find that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay
evidence and that nontestimonial statements still play an important role in convicting de-
fendants); Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 401, 406 (2005) (pointing to Oregon courts as an example of upholding confrontation
rights for nontestimonial hearsay); Miguel A. M6ndez, Essay, Crawford v. Washington: A
Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 607-11 (2004); Smith, supra note 57, at 1524-28 (presenting
four proposals for when defendants should have the right to confront declarants of nontes-
timonial hearsay statements, such as admitting nontestimonial statements if they fall under
a firmly-rooted hearsay exception, unless the defendant shows that statement's
untrustworthiness).
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proceedings and criminal prosecutions share similar procedures and
goals. Third, constitutional concerns trump any potential hardship on the
government or majority vote.
As the Supreme Court continues to make changes to Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, these new principles should
not be confined merely to defendants in criminal prosecutions. Before the
jurisprudence for each right becomes too solidified and the relationship
between the two amendments irreparably falls apart, courts should
change course and invite the Sixth Amendment confrontation right to
have more direct influence in revocation proceedings.
